JULIAN DIMASE AND GAETANO DIMASE, APPELLANTS,
v.
AQUAMAR 176, INC., & CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 2003-01-29
No. 3D01-915
Before JORGENSON, COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, FLETCHER, SHEVIN, and RAMIREZ, JJ., SCHWARTZ, C.J., is recused.
835 So. 2d 1158 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases
Other
PER CURIAM.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM.

The appellants’ motion for rehearing en banc is granted and Judge Ramirez’s dissenting opinion is adopted as the opinion of the court. The judgment under review is therefore reversed.

COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, FLETCHER, SHEVIN, and RAMIREZ, JJ., concur. SCHWARTZ, C.J., is recused.

Dissent
GREEN, J.

GREEN, J.

(dissenting)

I would deny the motion for rehearing en bane for the reasons expressed in the initial majority opinion of this case.

JORGENSON, J., concurs.

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  • Sorocka v. Severe, 858 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
    …ly or impliedly stated within the offer. Thus, ‘[an] acceptance must contain an assent to the same matters contained in the offer.’ ” (citation omitted)). We stated in DiMase v. Aquamar 176, Inc., 835 So. 2d 1150, 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA), reh. granted, 835 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) that “what is an ‘essential term’ must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Here, the Sorockas only had two claims, one for personal injury and the other for property damage. We fail to see how one of those claims is not an “ess…

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