MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, APPELLANT,
v.
AUTHERIA MITCHELL, APPELLEE
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Miami-Dade County appealed a workers' compensation case where the claimant attempted to dismiss her petition without prejudice after remand but before the hearing. The court held that the dismissal was untimely under Florida's workers' compensation rules because the final hearing had already begun in the prior proceeding, and reversed to allow the claimant to proceed with testimony as required.
The court held that the claimant's voluntary dismissal was untimely and ineffective because under Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.075(d), voluntary dismissal is only permitted before the final hearing begins or during the final hearing before the claimant rests, and both conditions had already occurred in the prior proceeding. The court reversed and remanded for the claimant to testify in person as directed in Mitchell II.
[1] A claimant's voluntary dismissal of a workers' compensation claim is untimely if filed after the final hearing has begun and the claimant has rested their case.
[2] A voluntary dismissal filed after the final hearing has commenced and the claimant has rested their case is ineffective.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A claim or petition may be dismissed by the claimant or petitioner without an order by filing a notice or stipulation of voluntary dismissal at any time before the final hearing begins, or during the final hearing before the claimant rests.”
Establishes the legal standard for timely voluntary dismissal under Florida workers' compensation rules
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case returned to the court for the third time. After Mitchell II remanded the case for the claimant to testify in person regarding whether the wo…
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PER CURIAM.
This case has been before this court twice before. See Miami-Dade County v. Mitchell, 754 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (remanding for reconsideration in light of Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(en banc), to determine whether the workplace accident was the major contributing cause of the claimant’s need for future medical treatment)(“Mitchell I”); Mitchell v. Metro Dade, 797 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(re-manding for the Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) to afford claimant an opportunity to testify in person)(“Mitchell II”). In Mitchell II, the claimant appealed the JCC’s denial of her claim for future medical benefits. The JCC’s denial was based on a determination that the workplace accident was not the major contributing cause of the need for future medical treatment.
Just before the hearing on remand after Mitchell II was to begin, the claimant dismissed her claim without prejudice. The claimant alleges this action deprived the JCC of jurisdiction to take any further action on her claim. Appellant argues that claimant’s voluntary dismissal of her petition was untimely. We agree with Appellant and reverse.
A claim or petition may be dismissed by the claimant or petitioner without an order by filing a notice or stipulation of voluntary dismissal at any time before the final hearing begins, or during the final hearing before the claimant rests. Fla. R. Work. Comp. P. 4.075(d). The final hearing began and claimant rested her case when it was tried before Mitchell I. Therefore, claimant’s voluntary dismissal is not timely.
To allow claimant to take a voluntary dismissal after remand, under the circumstances of this case, would allow the claimant the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, a benefit not afforded to other claimants or contemplated by the rule. See Middlebrooks v. St. Johns Water Management District, 529 So. 2d 1167, 1169-70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)(holding that withdrawal of application for a consumptive use permit was not timely under the voluntary dismissal rule, and would “afford him the advantage of 20/20 hindsight” that no other party under the rule is allowed to have).
Because the claimant’s voluntary dismissal is not timely, and therefore is ineffective, we remand to the JCC to afford the claimant an opportunity to testify in person according to Mitchell II.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BARFIELD, MINER and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Closet Maid & Crawford & Co. v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Faust v. City OF N. Port, 529 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Autheria Mitchell v. Metro Dade & Risk Mgmt. for Dade Co., 797 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Autheria Mitchell, 754 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)