CHRISTOPHER LYONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2003-02-12
No. 4D01-2047
POLEN, C.J., SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.
837 So. 2d 540 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2003) Negative Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Christopher Lyons appeals his robbery conviction and challenges the sentencing court's imposition of various fees and costs without oral pronouncement. The appellate court vacates the drug testing fee for lack of oral pronouncement but affirms the remaining fees and rejects Lyons's constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme.


Holding

The court vacates the $30.00 drug testing fee because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing, as required by law. The court affirms the imposition of other costs and fees, rejecting the argument that statutory authority must be specified. The court also rejects the constitutional challenge to the Florida Criminal Punishment Code.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must orally pronounce a special condition of probation, such as a drug testing fee, at sentencing.

[2] A trial court is not required to specify the statutory authority for all costs and fees imposed at sentencing when the defendant acknowledges the statutory basis for thos…

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Key Quotes

“the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which the trial court must pronounce orally at sentencing.”

Establishes the legal standard requiring oral pronouncement of drug testing fees at sentencing under Florida law.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lyons was convicted of robbery and sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years probation. At sentencing, the trial court orally pronounce…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from a trial court finding Christopher Lyons guilty of robbery. As a result of his conviction, Lyons was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years probation. Additionally, at sentencing the court orally pronounced a public defender fee of an unspecified amount and court costs of $255.00. Subsequently, in the written orders of supervision, the court imposed the following fees, $50.00 “victim costs on counts,” $200.00 “trust fund,” $5.00 “assessment,” $30.00 “drug testing fee,” and a $700.00 “P.D. fee.”

A notice of appeal was timely filed. During the pendency of the appeal, Lyons filed a motion to correct the sentencing error contesting the imposition of the various fees without oral pronouncement and without specifying the statutory authority on which the fees were based. In addition, the motion challenged the constitutionality of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. In response, the trial court waived the $700.00 P.D. fee, and denied the motion on all other grounds. We vacate the portion of the order imposing the $30.00 drug testing fee, but affirm the order on all other grounds. Lyons raises three arguments on appeal. Initially Lyons contends that the trial court erred by imposing drug testing costs without having had orally pronounced such a requirement at sentencing. We agree.

The Florida Supreme Court has unequivocally held, “the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which the trial court must pronounce orally at sentencing.” State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla.1998). The condition that Lyons pay the drug testing fee was not pronounced orally at his sentencing and is hereby stricken.

Lyons next contends that the trial court erred by imposing costs and fees without specifying the statutory authority upon which they were based. We reject this argument. To support his position Lyons points to Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). This court has previously discussed at length why we find Sutton unpersuasive. See I.B. v. State, 806 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Moreover, although the court did not specify the statutory authority the costs and fees were based on, Lyons himself acknowledges the statutory authority for the various fees and costs imposed.

Last, Lyons alleges that the Florida Criminal Punishment Code is unconstitutional. We also reject this argument as the Florida Supreme Court has recently rejected it as well. See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757 (Fla.2002).

POLEN, C.J., SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Anderson v. State, 229 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
    …sessments. We have repeatedly held that it is unnecessary for a trial court to refer to the specific statutory authority for imposing costs in a written sentencing order. See Johnson v. State, 944 So. 2d 474, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Lyons v. State, 837 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); I.B. v. State, 806 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), abrogated on other grounds as stated in D.G. v. State, 896 So. 2d 920, 921-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Indeed, this court has explicitly rejected the Second District’s…
  • King v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D662 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)
    …y authority for each assessment imposed, the trial court was required to provide a breakdown of the assessments and identify what they represent, so as to permit this court to determine the statutory authority for each assessment.”); Lyons v. State, 837 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (recognizing trial court need not specify statutory authority authorizing costs; finding “Sutton unpersuasive”); I.B. v. State, 806 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[T]he record clearly reflects that the court stated th…
  • Johnson v. State, 944 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …o a defendant, the record must contain a citation to the proper statutory authority supporting the assessment of such costs. Sutton, 635 So. 2d at 1033. However, this court has on more than one occasion found Sutton unpersuasive. See Lyons v. State, 837 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also I.B. v. State, 806 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (rejecting Sutton as imposing a technical requirement beyond that required in any statute). Accordingly, we find that Johnson’s argument in this regard is w…

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