HAROLD JOE DEXTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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[*596] NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Harold Joe Dexter appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm, but we write to address one claim. Dexter contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek dismissal of the charges against him upon the expiration of the speedy trial period. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(a). We affirm on this point because Dexter has not alleged prejudice, and therefore his claim is facially insufficient.
We acknowledge that under this court’s decision in Williams v. State, 452 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), Dexter’s claim would have been facially sufficient. However, when Williams was decided in 1984 a defendant who was not brought to trial before expiration of the speedy trial period was entitled to discharge. Several months after Williams, our Supreme Court amended the speedy trial rule. The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules — Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1985). Under the version of the rule applicable to Dexter’s case, the State may bring a defendant to trial within fifteen days after receiving notice that the speedy trial period has expired. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p). Therefore, in order to show prejudice from counsel’s failure to give notice that the speedy trial period has expired, a defendant would have to allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period. Dexter has made no such allegation.
Accordingly, we affirm.
DAVIS and CANADY, JJ„ Concur.
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Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…st a speedy trial discharge also do not show that the proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair or that the state could not have brought him to trial within the time periods allowed by the speedy trial rule.” Id. at 549; see also Dexter v. State, 837 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a defendant fails to establish prejudice if he does not allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture window). Hammond, by contrast, relies on First District cases in which the court…
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Smith v. State, 988 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ial counsel’s conduct. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In particular, Mr. Smith did not “allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period.” Dexter v. State, 837 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Consequently, the postconviction court summarily denied these two claims as legally insufficient. We agree that the claims were legally insufficient. However, in light of the recent opinion in Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754…
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Wells v. State, 881 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…judiced by counsel’s failure to move for discharge under the speedy trial rules without establishing that the State could not bring the defendant to trial within the fifteen-day recapture period provided by rule 3.191(p)(3), compare Dexter v. State, 837 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), Wells relied on cases which provide that the State is not entitled to the fifteen-day recapture period if, within the speedy trial period, the defendant was neither re-arrested on the charges nor notified that the charges were fi…
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- The Fla. Bar re: Amendment to Rules-Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1984)
- Williams v. State, 452 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)