JOSHUA HAMPTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief was timely filed within the two-year period after his judgment and sentence became final.
Hampton pled guilty and was sentenced, then filed a motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the motion as untimely.…
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Hampton appeals from the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 for post-conviction relief. He asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied his motion on the sole ground that it was untimely because it was not filed within the two year time limit established by the rule. We reverse.
On July 24, 2000, Hampton pled guilty, was sentenced on various charges, and a judgment was rendered. He took no appeal. On August 19, 2002, he filed this rule 3.850 motion.
With regard to time limits, the rule provides:
A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case .... (emphasis supplied)
Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). The rule also provides for various exceptions to the two year time limit not applicable here.
When a judgment and sentence become final is key to the commencement of the running of the two year time limit. In Hampton’s case, since he took no appeal, his judgment and sentence became final thirty days after they were rendered; i.e., the time his appellate rights expired. See Ayo v. State, 708 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Davis v. State, 687 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). See also Mitchell v. State, 818 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Hampton thus had until August 23, 2002, in which to file his motion. Since he filed it on August 19, 2002, it was timely.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
THOMPSON, C.J., and MONACO, J, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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McQUAGGE v. State, 879 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…these same issues, although he labels them as grounds for having received an “illegal sentence.” This second motion is successive and an abuse of process. AFFIRMED. PALMER and MONACO, JJ., concur. . Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). See Hampton v. State, 837 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (since defendant took no appeal, his judgment and sentence became final 30 days after rendition).…
Authorities Cited
- Davis v. State, 687 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- AYO v. State, 708 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Seain C. Hull v. State, 708 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Mitchell v. State, 818 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)