CHRISTOPHER SUDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a trafficking conviction because the trial court abused its discretion in finding harmless a discovery violation involving an undisclosed State witness, applying the extraordinarily high standard that requires showing no reasonable possibility the defendant's trial preparation would have differed.
A trial court abuses its discretion when it deems a discovery violation harmless merely because a defendant knew of the witness's existence and could have deposed her, where there is a reasonable possibility the defendant's trial strategy would have materially differed had proper disclosure occurred.
[1] A discovery violation by the State is harmless only if the defendant cannot show a reasonable possibility that trial preparation or strategy would have materially differe…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the State commits a discovery violation, the standard for deeming the violation harmless is extraordinarily high. A defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced 'if there is a reasonable [possibility] that the defendant's trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.'”
Court explaining the legal standard for harmless error in discovery violations
Christopher Suda was convicted of trafficking in MDMA. The State failed to disclose a witness prior to trial, though Suda was aware the witness existe…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Christopher Suda, appeals his judgment and sentence for trafficking in Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of an undisclosed State witness. We agree, and reverse and remand the matter for a new trial.
While the trial court properly found the State’s failure to disclose the witness prior to trial was error, it abused its discretion in finding that the discovery violation was harmless because Suda was aware of the existence of the witness, and could have deposed her prior to trial.
[W]here the State commits a discovery violation, the standard for deeming the violation harmless is extraordinarily high. A defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced “if there is a reasonable [possibility] that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.”
Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 712 (Fla.2002) (quoting State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla.1995)). In this case, there is a reasonable possibility that had the State disclosed prior to trial its intent to call the witness, Suda would not only have deposed the witness, but may very well have altered his trial strategy. Thus, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that Suda was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation, and we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Cox, 819 So. 2d at 712. In light of our determination as to this issue, we see no need to address Suda’s other claim.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DAVIS, BROWNING and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006)…e also Irish v. State, 889 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a prior statement made by the defendant to the police that was withheld from the defense attorney undermined the defense’s theory and therefore was harmful); Suda v. State, 838 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (concluding that the State’s nondisclosure of its intent to call a witness prior to trial was harmful because it may have affected the defense’s trial strategy); Portner v. State, 802 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (hol…
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Muniz v. State, 988 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ut her testimony. Or, the defense may have further investigated Slocum’s proposed testimony. Based on our record, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that Muniz did not suffer procedural prejudice from the discovery violation. See Suda v. State, 838 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the State’s failure to disclose prior to trial its intent to call a witness “may very well have altered” the defendant’s trial strategy). Therefore, we reverse and remand for a…
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McDuffie v. State, 233 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…sclosure. See Muniz, 988 So. 2d at 1197-98 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the State’s inadvertent failure to timely disclose its intent to call a potential rebuttal witness “may have changed [the defense’s] strategy”); Suda v. State, 838 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (concluding that the State’s untimely disclosure of its intent to call a witness at trial was not harmless error because it could have changed the defendant’s trial strategy). Therefore, we must reverse and remand for a new…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995)
- COX v. State, 819 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2002)