STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BO CHRISTMAN, APPELLEE
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The State appeals the trial court's suppression of evidence from a warrantless search following Christman's arrest. The court reversed, holding that the deputy's initial contact was a consensual encounter where he lawfully requested identification, and the arrest was supported by probable cause once the deputy discovered a license restriction violation.
The deputy's initial contact was a lawful consensual encounter, not a stop or detention. An officer may request identification during a consensual encounter without articulable suspicion of a crime. Once the deputy discovered the license restriction violation, he had probable cause to arrest, and the search incident to arrest was lawful.
[1] A law enforcement officer may request identification and a driver's license during a consensual citizen encounter without needing articulable suspicion of a crime.
[2] The mere positioning of a law enforcement vehicle does not convert a consensual encounter into an improper stop or detention if the individual is not prevented from leavi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an officer is entitled to request identification and a driver's license as part of a consensual citizen encounter”
Establishes that the trial court erred in requiring articulable suspicion before requesting driver's license information during a consensual encounter.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA sheriff's deputy, on break at a gas station, observed Christman pumping gas and positioned his marked cruiser perpendicular to Christman's vehicle t…
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DAVIS, Judge.
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Bo Christman’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that law enforcement improperly stopped Christman and requested driver’s license information, which led to Christman’s ultimate arrest, search of his vehicle, and the discovery of narcotics. We reverse.
Christman drove his automobile into a gas station at approximately 5:00 a.m. A sheriffs deputy was parked in the station’s parking lot on break. Christman pulled his car up to the fuel pump and exited the vehicle. As he did so, the deputy pulled his marked car over to the area where Christman’s vehicle was parked. The deputy’s car was stopped perpendicular to the rear of Christman’s car. The deputy spotted a transporter tag on the back of Christman’s vehicle. Being unfamiliar with the tag, the deputy called out to Christman to inquire as to the nature of the tag. Christman walked over to the deputy, who was still in his car. As he engaged Christman in conversation, the deputy detected an odor of alcohol on Christman’s breath and observed that Christman’s eyes appeared bloodshot and glassy. The deputy exited his vehicle and asked Christman for his driver’s license. When Christman produced the license, the deputy found that it was restricted to business purposes only. Upon inquiry, Christ-man advised that he had been just driving around. Because driving around at 5:00 a.m. did not amount to business purposes, the deputy arrested Christman on a violation of the license restriction. After taking Christman into custody, the deputy searched Christman’s vehicle and found narcotics. •
At the suppression hearing, the trial court found that “the police officer effectively stopped the Defendant by pulling his vehicle perpendicular to the Defendant while he was refueling his vehicle.” Further, the court determined that the officer erred in asking for Christman’s driver’s license “when there was no articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed” and that this inquiry turned the incident into a stop. The trial court concluded that this was not an encounter because Christ-man’s actions were innocent in nature. The court further determined that by directing the defendant to respond, the officer effectively detained Christman without reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.
A ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. While the trial court’s factual findings are entitled to deference, State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), the trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo, Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
The trial court’s finding that the deputy’s act of pulling his car up to the side of Christman’s car was, in effect, a stop of Christman is not supported by the testimony. The only witness at the hearing was the deputy. He testified that when he pulled his car up to where Christman was pumping gas, Christman could have left in his vehicle by pulling forward or by putting his car in reverse and backing away from the gas pump. The testimony indicated that the mere positioning of the deputy’s car did not in any way prevent Christman from leaving the scene. Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that the positioning of the cruiser converted the consensual encounter into an improper stop or detention.
Furthermore, the trial court’s conclusion that the deputy needed “articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed” before he could request driver’s license information is an inaccurate statement of law. As expressed in Hines v. State, 737 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), an officer is entitled to request identification and a driver’s license as part of a consensual citizen encounter. Based on the facts presented, the deputy’s conversation with Christman was but a consensual encounter until the deputy suspected that Christman was in violation of the business purposes restriction on his license. At that point in time, the deputy had probable cause to make the arrest. The search that followed was incident to that arrest. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.
Reversed and remanded.
BLUE, C.J., and COVINGTON, J., Concur.
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Brye v. State, 927 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997); State v. Robinson, 740 So. 2d 9, 13 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Christman, 838 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The United States Supreme Court has stated that mixed [*81] questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional rights are to be reviewed by the appellate courts applying a two-step approach. Deference is to…
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Navamuel v. State, 12 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…s arising from the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 668, 668-69 (Fla.2004); Delorenzo v. State, 921 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). In other words, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Christman, 838 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “The trial court is vested with the authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence ....” Delorenzo, 921 So. 2d at 876. In this case, the trial court was free to reject appellant’s te…
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State v. Johns, 920 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…that his consent was not voluntary. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Poster, 892 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Factual findings are entitled to deference, State v. Christman, 838 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and reversal is possible “only if the findings are not supported by competent, substantial evidence,” Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla.2004). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Pos…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Hines v. State, 737 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Donnie Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)