TOBY E. COLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-02-12
No. 2D01-3582
SILBERMAN and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.
838 So. 2d 1205 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Negative Treatment
Cited by 12 cases


Opinion of the Court
FULMER, Judge.

FULMER, Judge.

Toby Cole entered a plea of no contest to trafficking in amphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended license, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. See State v. Miller, 565 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (upholding traffic stop based on driving at night with an inoperable tag light); § 316.221(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).

Cole also challenges the sentence imposed for trafficking in amphetamine. The State agrees that remand for resentencing is necessary because Cole was sentenced under the same statute found unconstitutional by this court in Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 821 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2002).

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, reverse the sentence, and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect on the date of the offenses.

Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Allen v. State, 853 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …entence could not have changed anything. The instant case is not like Johnson and McKenzie, where the orders were silent regarding the minimum terms, because here the original sentence clearly required a three-year minimum term. Cf. Fuston v. State, 838 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (corrections department, which informed trial court that it would treat the defendant’s sentence as though a minimum term had been imposed, has no authority to impose a more onerous sentence upon a prisoner than the sentence actua…
  • Canete v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 967 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …y “illegal,” DOC had no call to seek “clarification” of those sentences, nor did it have authority to modify the sentences based on the sentencing judge’s letter.4 Although it arose in a different procedural context, the decision in Fuston v. State, 838 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), is instructive in this regard. In Fuston, DOC sent a letter to the sentencing court claiming that it had failed to impose certain minimum mandatory terms that were required by law. Upon receipt of the letter, the sentencing court…
  • Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …appealable. Cf. Butler v. State, 973 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting that a defendant has a due process right to be represented by counsel at any resentenc-ing and to be informed of his right to appeal the new sentence); Fuston v. State, 838 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (questioning the validity of an amended sentence as violative of due process when the defendant was not advised that the amended sentence was appealable); Canete v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 967 So. 2d 412, 416 n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA…

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