JOHN J. ZANGARI, APPELLANT,
v.
TRACY CUNNINGHAM, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the classification of stock as marital property and the award of bridge-the-gap alimony, but reversed the special equity award in the marital home and remanded for review of the life insurance requirement for alimony.
[1] A spouse may be required to maintain life insurance to protect the financial well-being of the other spouse in appropriate circumstances.
[2] An order requiring a party to purchase life insurance to secure a support obligation must have a sufficient evidentiary basis, including evidence of insurability and cost…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced after a marriage of several years. The trial court awarded bridge-the-gap alimony to the former wife, required the former husband…
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SALCINES, Judge.
John J. Zangari, the former husband, appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage challenging the trial court’s classification of specific stock as marital, the award of bridge-the-gap alimony to the former wife, and the requirement that he secure that alimony award with life insurance.1 Tracy Cunningham, the for mer wife, cross-appeals from the final judgment challenging the trial court’s award, to the former husband, of a special equity interest in the marital home. We affirm, without further discussion, the classification of the stock at issue as marital and the award of bridge-the-gap alimony to the former wife. We affirm the trial court’s requirement that the former husband maintain life insurance to secure the alimony payments, but reverse and remand for a review of the amount and terms of that insurance. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of a special equity interest in the marital home.
The parties were married in 1995 and have twin children who were born in 1995. The parties separated in November 1998 and their marriage was dissolved in 2001.
In the final judgment of dissolution, the former wife was awarded bridge-the-gap alimony through 2004 and the former husband was ordered to secure that award with life insurance in the amount of $250,000. In appropriate circumstances, a spouse can be required to maintain life insurance for the purpose of protecting the financial well-being of the other spouse. Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.1989). Under the facts of the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring that the former husband maintain a life insurance policy to secure the alimony awarded to the former wife. However, the amount of the coverage which the former husband was ordered to maintain lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis — the record contains no evidence of the former husband’s insurability at the time of the final hearing or the cost of the proposed insurance and, thus, the former husband’s ability to pay that unspecified cost. See Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that an order requiring a party to purchase life insurance to secure a support obligation must have the requisite evidentiary basis, and reversing for further proceedings to reevaluate the life insurance requirement set forth to secure child support obligations). Further, as in Merkin v. Merkin, 804 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the specific amount of coverage ordered in the present case bore no correlation to the projected alimony amounts. Thus, we reverse the requirement that the former husband maintain life insurance coverage in the amount of $250,000 to secure the bridge-the-gap alimony, and we remand for further proceedings.2
The award, to the former husband, of a special equity interest in the parties’ marital home also requires a reversal and remand. In Florida, there is a presumption that entireties real property is marital property regardless of who paid for it. § 61.075(5)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (2001). In order to overcome the statutory presumption, the party seeking a special equity has the burden of proving that a gift was not intended. See Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1991).
In the present case, the parties’ home, which was purchased after the marriage, was jointly titled and thus enjoyed the presumption of marital property. The trial court awarded the former husband a special equity interest based upon evidence that the former husband had made the down payment for the parties’ marital home with Ms nonmarital assets. Standing alone, that evidence was insufficient to prove that the former husband did not intend a gift. See Cattaneo v. Cattaneo, 803 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Hence, the trial court erred in awarding the former husband a special equity in the jointly titled marital home because the former husband did not overcome the statutory presumption by demonstrating that a gift was not intended.
As explained in Cattaneo, however, the trial court’s error does not mean that the former wife is necessarily entitled to fifty percent of the value of the marital home. See id. at 891. Thus, on remand the trial court should reevaluate the equitable distribution of the marital home. Id.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
CASANUEVA and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur. . We note that the trial court also ordered the former husband to procure life insurance to secure his child support obligations. Howev er, the former husband does not challenge the life insurance requirement in regard to his child support obligations.
. Although we remand the present case for further proceedings on this issue, we do so with some reservation. The need to secure the bridge-the-gap alimony award with life insurance can be affirmed from facts evident in the record. The amount and terms of the life insurance coverage cannot be affirmed on this record due to a failure of proof. Because the appropriate remedy upon a reversal was not presented as an issue in the present case and this area of the law was emerging during the period of time these parties presented their case, we have remanded for further proceedings rather than merely reversing the requirement that the former husband secure the alimony award with life insurance. See Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
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Kotlarz v. Kotlarz, 21 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…o. 2d 656, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Alpha v. Alpha , 885 So. 2d 1023, 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). “The amount of insurance must be related to the extent of the obligation being secured.” Burnham, 884 So. 2d at 392 (citing Zangan v. Cunningham, 839 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). Here, the final judgment includes no specific findings supporting the life insurance requirement; therefore, we reverse as to the life insurance issue and remand for reconsideration. HAWKES, C.J., WOLF and WETHERELL, JJ.,…
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Burnham v. Burnham, 884 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…la. 2d DCA 2002); Cissel v. Cissel, 845 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Forgione v. Forgione, 845 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The amount of insurance must be related to the extent of the obligation being secured. Zangari v. Cunningham, 839 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The judgment and the record in this case lack any of the required showings, and the directive to maintain life insurance therefore must be reversed. On this issue we remand for further proceedings. [*393] (d) Direction to Ma…
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Trent L. Smith v. Heidrun Smith, 912 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…2005) (quoting Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023, 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). We also have noted that “[t]he amount of insurance must be related to the extent of the obligation being secured.” Burnham, 884 So. 2d at 392 (citing Zangari v. Cunningham, 839 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). Consequently, a final judgment requiring the security of life insurance must specify whether the insurance is security for unpaid support obligations, in which case only a portion of the proceeds might be encumbered, or whe…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1991)
- Goldie Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989)
- Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Vashti Cattaneo v. Cattaneo, 803 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Merkin v. Merkin, 804 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)