EDEN OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
EDEN III, INC., ROY ANDERSON CORP., AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, PATRICK T. HOPE, ROY ANDERSON, JR., ROY ANDERSON, III, JOHN C. ELLIS AND CHARLES F. MCREYNOLDS, APPELLEES
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The Eden Owners Association appealed a nonfinal order staying civil proceedings and compelling arbitration, arguing the appellees waived their right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation before requesting arbitration. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that no waiver occurred because the arbitrable claim did not arise until the second amended complaint, at which point the appellees promptly moved to compel arbitration.
The appellees did not waive their right to arbitration because the appellant failed to set forth an actionable claim based upon contracts containing arbitration provisions until the second amended complaint, and the appellees promptly moved to compel arbitration thereafter.
[1] A party does not waive the right to arbitration by responding to prior complaints that did not set forth actionable claims based upon contracts containing arbitration pro…
[2] Waiver of the right to arbitrate requires a showing of knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration, actions inconsistent with that right, and prejudice to the pa…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the party seeking to prove waiver of a right to arbitrate must demonstrate knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration, facts inconsistent with that existing right, and prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from inconsistent acts; party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof”
Establishes the three-part test for proving waiver of arbitration rights and the heavy burden of proof required
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant raised disputes in its initial and first amended complaints, and the appellees responded to these complaints and engaged in pre-trial li…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges a nonfinal order staying the underlying civil proceedings and compelling arbitration. It con tends that the appellees waived the right to seek arbitration because they had prior knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and engaged in acts inconsistent with that right. Specifically, the appellant asserts that it raised arbitrable issues in its initial and first amended complaints, and thus the appellees waived arbitration by responding to these complaints, engaging in pre-trial litigation, and failing to request arbitration until after the appellant’s second amended complaint. Because we conclude that the appellant failed to set forth an actionable claim based upon breach of the construction contract or other contracts containing arbitration provisions until the second amended complaint, and because the appellees promptly moved to compel arbitration thereafter, the appel-lees’ responses to the initial and first amended complaints did not constitute a waiver. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So. 2d 2 (Ala.1998); see also Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Cowan, 601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (noting that the party seeking to prove waiver of a right to arbitrate must demonstrate knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration, facts inconsistent with that existing right, and prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from inconsistent acts; party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638 (7th Cir.1981) (finding that “no waiver of the right to arbitrate can occur from conducting discovery on non-arbitrable claims.”); accord Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F. 2d 885 (2d Cir.1985).
The order below is accordingly affirmed.
VAN NORTWICK and POLSTON, JJ„ and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur.
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Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2005)…As to this issue, the Second District’s decision recognized conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Lane and with the First District Court of Appeal’s decisions in Benedict and Eden Owners Association, Inc. v. Eden III, Inc., 840 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The First and Third Districts held that there was a requirement for proof of prejudice for there to be a waiver of a right to arbitrate sufficient to deny arbitration. The Second District’s decision is consistent with decisions…
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Marine Env't P'rs, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…uiry, however, since it is also necessary that the defendants were aware that the complaint raised claims “arising out of or relating to” the Licensing Agreement in which the arbitration agreement was located. In Eden Owners Ass’n v. Eden III, Inc., 840 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), relied upon by the trial court below, the court held that because appellant had failed to set forth an actionable claim based upon breach of the contract in which the arbitration right was contained until the second amended…
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Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 851 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…691 So. 2d at 5 n. 1. The First District has since agreed with the Third District on this issue. See Benedict v. Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1238, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1359 (Fla. 1st DCA June 9, 2003); Eden Owners Ass’n v. Eden III, Inc., 840 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). We see three problems with the Third District’s decision in Lane. First, this court is not bound by decisions of the Eleventh Circuit on issues of federal law. Rather, this court is bound only by the United States Supreme…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Clarance B. Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981)
- Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1985)
- The Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Paul Cowan ad Litem of the Estate of David Arthur Overstreet, 601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)