K.S., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to present sufficient evidence for two elements of the trespass crime.
[1] A motion for judgment of acquittal must be granted if the state fails to present evidence of each element of the charged crime.
[2] The elements of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance include willful entering or remaining in the property, lack of authorization, and notice against…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of trespass in a park after hours. The state's evidence did not establish the appellant's intent or that the appellant had not…
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BROWNING, J.
This is the direct appeal from a conviction for trespass in a park afterhours. We hold that the trial court erred in failing to grant Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to put forth evidence of two of the elements of the crime. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence.
To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have put forth evidence of each element in each crime. The crime of trespass has four elements. The statute on trespass reads as follows:
A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: as to which notice against entering or remaining in is given, (1) ... by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 ... commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
§ 810.09(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Thus, the elements of the crime are (1) willful entering or remaining in property, (2) the property is not a structure or conveyance, (3) the person is not authorized, licensed, or invited, and (4) the person has notice against entering or remaining. In the instant appeal, the state did not put forth evidence sufficient to prove the first element, intent, or the last element, notice.
The state called the arresting officer, who testified as to the circumstances of the arrest. His testimony, however, did not touch on Appellant’s intent. There was simply no evidence that, when Appellant entered or remained in the park after hours as a passenger in a car, he did so willfully. Further, we find on this record insufficient evidence to demonstrate either that Appellant had actual notice or that the park was properly posted so as to give adequate constructive notice. See § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); In Interest of B.P., 610 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Thus, the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal.
REVERSED.
ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
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E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…ed on appeal by the de novo standard of review. See Jones v. State, 790 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have put forth evidence of each element in each crime.” See K.S. v. State, 840 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The statute applicable, section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: 810.097 Trespass upon grounds or facilities of a school; penalties; arrest.— (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the cam…
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L.J.S. v. State, 905 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ct of suspected trespass, alone. See State v. Pye, 551 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The crime of trespass in a park after hours occurs, however, only if the suspect had actual or constructive notice that the park was closed. K.S. v. State, 840 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing § 810.09(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001)); In Interest of B.M., 553 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). There is no evidence that L.J.S. knew the park was closed. The State presented no evidence that the park’s hours of o…
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Bettey v. State, 244 So. 3d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…failed to prove the crimes occurred during the dates alleged, Appellant would not be entitled to relief. In order to overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the State must put forth evidence of each element of the crime. See K.S. v. State, 840 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The State was not required to prove that the crime took place on the exact dates listed in the information, as that is not an element of the offense. In Tingley v. State, 549 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1989), the supreme court…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of B.P. & A.P., 610 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)