EDWIN WILLIAM TIMMER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 5th DCA | 2003-03-28
No. 5D03-16
SHARP, W. and PLEUS JJ., concur.
840 So. 2d 1160 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Timmer petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to reduce and modify his sentence based on lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion solely because no action was taken within 60 days, as the scheduling delay was beyond Timmer's control and the trial court had authority to enlarge the time for ruling.


Holding

The trial court has jurisdiction to consider a timely-filed rule 3.800(c) motion and possesses authority to grant an enlargement of time to rule on the motion when the delay in scheduling a hearing is beyond the petitioner's control. The trial court's denial of the motion based solely on lack of jurisdiction was error.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to rule on a timely filed motion to reduce or modify a sentence, even if the ruling occurs beyond the initial 60-day period, provided t…

[2] A trial court may sua sponte enlarge the time for ruling on a motion to reduce or modify a sentence filed under Rule 3.800(c).

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“within a reasonable time period, a trial court possesses jurisdiction to grant a petitioner's motion for enlargement of time or to sum sponte enlarge the time for ruling on a timely filed 3.800 motion”

Establishes that trial courts have authority to enlarge time beyond the 60-day window for timely-filed sentencing modification motions

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Timmer pled guilty to fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the operation of a cemetery and was sentenced to five years incarceration. His conviction …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PALMER, J.

PALMER, J.

Edwin William Timmer petitions this court for a writ of certiorari contending that the trial court erred in refusing to conduct a hearing on his pending motion to reduce and modify his sentence. Concluding that Timmer is entitled to receive a hearing on his sentencing motion, we grant the petition.

Timmer pled guilty to fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the operation of a cemetery and was sentenced a term of five years incarceration. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Timmer’s conviction and sentence, and the mandate was issued on September 6, 2002. See Timmer v. State, 824 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

On September 30, 2002, Timmer filed a rule 3.800(c) motion to reduce and modify his sentence.1 However, he was unable to obtain a hearing date on his motion within 60 days of the filing date. Instead, Timmer received a hearing date of January 24, 2003. The prosecutor was notified of the hearing date on October 8, 2002. Two months later, on December 5, 2002, the trial court sua sponte entered an order denying Timmer’s 3.800 motion based on lack of jurisdiction holding that, although the motion had been timely filed, no action was taken on the motion within 60 days as required by the rule. This decision was error. Florida Rule of Criminal procedure 3.800(c) provides, in relevant part:

Rule 3.800 Correction, Reduction, and Modification of Sentences

Reduction and modification. A court may reduce or modify ... a legal sentence imposed by it ... within 60 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued by the appellate court

In Abreu v. State, 660 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1995), our supreme court held that, within a reasonable time period, a trial court possesses jurisdiction to grant a petitioner’s motion for enlargement of time or to sum sponte enlarge the time for ruling on a timely filed 3.800 motion. No formal rule 3.050 motion for enlargement of time needs to be filed in order for a petitioner to be entitled to receive an enlargement of time, where the scheduling of the hearing beyond the 60-day period is beyond the petitioner’s control. See State v. Paulino, 696 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Thus, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying Tim-mer’s motion on jurisdictional grounds since the motion was timely filed and the failure to obtain a ruling on the motion within 60 days was the result of his inability to obtain a hearing with the court.

PETITION GRANTED.

SHARP, W. and PLEUS JJ., concur. . See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Schlabach v. State, 37 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 2010)
    …court is unable to rule upon a timely filed motion to mitigate within the allotted sixty-day window). The Fifth District Court of Appeal has employed reasoning similar to that of the Second District in reaching the same result. In Timmer v. State, 840 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence in advance of the expiration of the sixty-day window. However, he was unable to obtain a hearing on his motion within the sixty days. Id. The trial court denied the motio…
  • Graham v. State, 24 So. 3d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)
    …in Abreu v. State, 660 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1995), this court has consistently held that trial courts retain jurisdiction to hear timely filed motions pursuant to rule 3.800(c) past the sixty-day time frame. See Wills, 963 So. 2d at 356; Timmer v. State, 840 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Haber v. State, 849 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In Timmer, we held that where the motion for mitigation was timely filed, no formal motion for enlargement of time under rule 3.050 was required when the scheduling of the hea…
  • Mathis v. State, 957 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …hich the trial court could modify her sentence. Therefore, we conclude the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in denying the motion as untimely. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Timmer v. State, 840 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); State v. Paulino, 696 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We grant the petition, quash the trial court’s orders of denial dated March 2nd and 13th, 2006, and remand for a consideration of the motion on the merits. Petition granted,…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw