MELINDA M. FARR, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES D. FARR, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed a divorce judgment but reversed the dismissal of a domestic violence injunction due to lack of notice and due process, and struck a post-appeal order for rehearing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter an order on a motion for rehearing filed after a notice of appeal has been timely filed, even if the order would benefit the appellant.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to enter an order on a motion for rehearing upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal, and any such order must be struck even if it wo…
[2] Dismissal of a domestic violence injunction without notice to the parties and without a motion to dismiss violates due process.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMelinda Farr appealed a final judgment dissolving her marriage to James Farr dated January 10, 2002. The trial court dismissed a domestic violence inj…
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ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.
Melinda M. Farr appeals a final judgment dated January 10, 2002, dissolving her marriage to James D. Farr. We affirm all aspects of the final judgment except the provision that dismissed an injunction against domestic violence. At the time of the final hearing, Mr. Farr had not moved to dismiss the injunction, and neither party was on notice that the trial court would consider this issue. Accordingly, the final judgment did not accord due process for this issue.
Reluctantly, we must also strike an order resolving a motion for rehearing, which the trial court entered on April 11, 2002. Ms. Farr filed a timely motion for rehearing and then “in an abundance of caution” filed a notice of appeal on February 8, 2002. The motion for rehearing was abandoned by the filing of the notice of appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h)(3). Ms. Farr now complains that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order resolving her own abandoned motion for rehearing, even though many aspects of this order were to her benefit. For example, the trial court attempted to correct its own error concerning the dismissal of the domestic violence injunction. Nevertheless, we must strike the order because Ms. Farr is correct that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it. See Rice v. Brown, 645 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WHATLEY and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 111 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…Tarazona, 64 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that when a motion for rehearing is abandoned by the filing of a notice of appeal, the trial court then lacks jurisdiction to enter an order on the motion for rehearing) (citing Farr v. Farr, 840 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). At the hearing on the plaintiffs motions, the plaintiff (as well as counsel for the defendant) argued: (1) GEICO was liable for the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees under the offer of judgment statute because GEICO was “in control of…
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Mora v. McDONOUGH, 934 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…he final order shall be deemed rendered by the filing of the notice of appeal as to all claims between parties who then have no such motions pending between them.”). Thus, the trial court’s Order Denying Rehearing must be stricken. See Farr v. Farr, 840 So. 2d 1166, 1166-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (striking the trial court’s order resolving a motion for rehearing, which was entered after the appellant filed a notice of appeal, on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it). Accordingly, we REV…
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Yost v. Fiallos, 64 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…f jurisdiction to rehear, reconsider, or vacate the December 7 Order. Therefore, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it rendered the February 10 Order, and accordingly, departed from the essential requirements of law. Farr v. Farr, 840 So. 2d 1166, 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“The motion for rehearing was abandoned by the filing of the notice of appeal” and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order on the motion for rehearing.) (citation omitted); Palm Beach Cnty. v. Boca Dev.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rice v. Brown, 645 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)