CITY OF MELBOURNE, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA L. DUNN & JERRY WAYNE DUNN, APPELLEE
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Linda Dunn sued the City of Melbourne after falling on a raised planter while exiting a city park. The trial court awarded her damages, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the planter's raised timber structure and gap between planks constituted an obvious hazard that the city had no duty to warn about.
The court held that the raised timber planter constituted an open and obvious hazard as a matter of law, and the city had no duty to warn of it or make it safe for walking. Dunn, having noticed the structure and any gaps between planks had she been looking, could not recover damages from the city for injuries resulting from her decision to cross rather than walk around the planter.
[1] A landowner is not required to warn an invitee of a danger that is open and obvious.
[2] A condition that is open, obvious, common, and innocuous as a matter of law does not constitute a hidden dangerous condition.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An owner of land is not required to give an invitee warning of an obvious danger, and is entitled to assume an invitee will perceive something obvious.”
Establishes the foundational legal principle that property owners have no duty to warn of obvious hazards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDunn exited a city park with her husband and grandchild and encountered a raised timber planter measuring 21x7 feet with 12-inch-high stacked timber p…
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COBB, W., Senior Judge.
The City of Melbourne appeals a final judgment in favor of Linda Dunn, who was awarded damages for injuries she sustained as a result of a fall in a city park. The city contends that the court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict. We reverse.
Dunn, along with her husband and her grandchild, exited the park and encountered a raised planter. The planter was composed of a perimeter of timber planks forming a rectangle of 21x7 feet. The planks forming the perimeter, each 6 inches in height, were stacked one atop the other, for a height of 12 inches. The planter was filled with dirt and mulch, and plants in a staggered formation. Despite the fact that there was a path directly beside the planter, Dunn testified that she thought that the route to the parking lot was over and across this obstruction, rather than around it. Dunn traversed the planter and tripped because, she thought, her foot was caught in a crevice caused by the separation of the planks forming one corner of the planter. Below the surface of the planks, a large nail that seemed to have been intended to secure the corner of the planter was dislodged from one of the planks, and Dunn thought that the strap to her sandal may have been caught by the nail. Although Dunn testified that she walked across the planted area, a witness testified that Dunn walked along the edge of the planter, remaining on the timbers.
An owner of land is not required to give an invitee warning of an obvious danger, and is entitled to assume an invitee will perceive something obvious. Moultrie v. Consolidated Stores International Corp., 764 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Some conditions are so open and obvious, so common and innocuous, that they can be held as a matter of law to not constitute a hidden dangerous condition. Gorin v. City of St. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). In the instant case, the photographs in the record, attached hereto, show that the gap between the intersecting planks was a blatant, yawning separation, and Dunn admitted that if she had been looking, she would have seen it. As in Taylor v. Universal City Property Management, 779 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), the 21x7x1 foot planter was a “glaringly open and obvious obstacle” for anyone walking out of the park, and Dunn “knew, or should have known” that she mounted and walked on a foot-high planter built of timbers and filled with mulch and plantings. As in Taylor, 779 So. 2d at 622, we conclude that anyone walking across this planter “is held to know that this is a hazard to walking.” Because Dunn had “ample notice of an open and obvious hazard,” she cannot blame the city for her fall. Id.
Furthermore, the city had no duty to make the planter safe for walking, a function for which it was not designed. Compare, McCain v. Florida Power Corporation, 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1992); Acree v. Hartford South Inc., 724 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The city had no reason to suspect that a grown woman would consider the planter an exit path, or use it to perform a sort of tightrope act, instead of proceeding to the parking lot by simply walking around it along the adjacent path.
REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of judgment for the defendant below, City of Melbourne.
PALMER, J„ and HARRIS, Senior Judge, concur. ATTACHMENT
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Dandal Dampier v. Morgan Tire & Auto, LLC, 82 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…warn or take other precautionary measures). Moreover, a number of cases have held that a landowner has no liability for falls which occur when invitees walk on surfaces not designed for walking, such as planting beds. See City of Melbourne v. Dunn, 841 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Taylor v. Universal City Prop. Mgmt., 779 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Prager v. Marks Bros., 483 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). [*207] In Taylor, a woman twisted and injured her knee when she stepped on the edge of one of a…
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Marriott Int'l, Inc. v. Zaira Perez-Melendez, 855 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ecause the issue of whether the condition on the premises is dangerous is a question of law rather than an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. In support of that contention, Marriott cites several cases from this court: City of Melbourne v. Dunn, 841 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Taylor v. Universal City [*631] Property Management, 779 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 799 So. 2d 219 (Fla.2001); Krol v. City of Orlando, 778 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Rosenfeld v. Walt Disney World Co., 651 S…
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Sherwin Wolf v. Sam's E., Inc., 132 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…nerally found not to constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law.... [A] landowner has no liability for falls which occur when invitees walk on surfaces not designed for walking, such as planting beds.” Id. (citing City of Melbourne v. Dunn, 841 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Taylor v. Universal City Prop. Mgmt., 779 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); K.G. v. Winter Springs Cmty. Evangelical Congregational Church, 509 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Prager v. Marks Bros. Co., 483 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCAIN v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992)
- Gorin v. City OF ST. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Moultrie v. Consol. Stores Int'l Corp., 764 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Taylor v. Universal City Prop. Mgmt., 779 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Acree v. Hartford S. Inc., 724 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)