JORGE FIGAROLA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2003-03-19
No. 4D02-1039
HAZOURI and MAY, JJ„ concur.
841 So. 2d 576 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

Figarola appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that Apprendi v. New Jersey should apply retroactively to invalidate sentence enhancement points for sexual penetration that exceeded the statutory maximum. The Fourth District affirmed the denial, holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively under Florida law, but certified the retroactivity question to the Florida Supreme Court.


Holding

The court held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively under either Florida's Witt test or the federal Teague standard. The court affirmed the denial of Figarola's motion but certified the retroactivity question as one of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.


Headnotes

[1] Apprendi v. …

[2] State courts are not required to follow federal law when determining the retroactivity of their own decisions.

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Key Quotes

“decisions would not be applied retroactively on collateral review unless: (1) the decision placed conduct beyond the power of the government to proscribe; or (2) the decision announced a "watershed" rule of constitutional criminal procedure such as the right to counsel.”

Establishes the Teague standard for retroactivity, which the court applied to reject Apprendi's retroactive application.

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Facts & Procedural History

Figarola was sentenced using a scoresheet that assessed points for sexual penetration, resulting in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. He filed …

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Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, J.

KLEIN, J.

Appellant seeks review of the denial of his rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence, which argued that the assessment of scoresheet points for sexual penetration, resulting in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The issue he raises is whether Apprendi applies retroactively on postconviction relief. In Hughes v. State, 826 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the court held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to a similar claim being raised under rule 3.800.

The Hughes court analyzed for retroactivity based on the principles adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1980). We agree with the Hughes court’s analysis that, under Witt, Apprendi is not retroactive.

Witt was based on the federal retroactivity decisions, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). The United States Supreme Court no longer uses the Linkletter-Stovall test. It narrowed the type of its decisions which would be retroactive in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). The Teague court held that decisions would not be applied retroactively on collateral review unless: (1) the decision placed conduct beyond the power of the government to proscribe; or (2) the decision announced a “watershed” rule of constitutional criminal procedure such as the right to counsel. Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060.

State courts, however, are not required to follow federal law when deciding the retroactivity of their own decisions. Great No. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). Florida continues to follow Witt. State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995).1

All federal circuit courts of appeal deciding the issue have also concluded that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on collateral review.2 In all probability the United States Supreme Court will agree with those decisions because of the narrow standard of retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions announced in Teague.

We conclude that Apprendi would not be retroactive under Witt or Teague. We therefore affirm but certify as a question of great public importance the same issue certified by the Hughes court: DOES THE RULING ANNOUNCED IN APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), APPLY RETROACTIVELY?

HAZOURI and MAY, JJ„ concur. . Some states have adopted Teague without discussing the fact that Teague is not binding on state courts when they are determining if their own decisions are retroactive. Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, ALA L. REV. 421, 457 (Winter 1993). The Supreme Court’s opinion in Teag-ue reflected that court's narrowing view of the rule of federal habeas corpus. The policy considerations behind Teague are not necessarily the same as those for state court post-conviction relief. Id.

. See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F. 3d 8 (1st Cir.2000); Forbes v. United States, 262 F. 3d 143 (2d Cir.2001); In re Turner, 267 F. 3d 225 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Sanders, 247 F. 3d 139 (4th Cir.2001); Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F. 3d 866 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Moss, 252 F. 3d 993 (8th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F. 3d 1227 (9th Cir.2000); Browning v. United States, 241 F. 3d 1262 (10th Cir.2001); McCoy v. United States, 266 F. 3d 1245 (11th Cir.2001).

.Apprendi was characterized as a procedural rule by the Supreme Court. 530 U.S. at 475 and 497. Since announcing Teague, the Supreme Court has not given retroactive effect to any decisions announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. United States v. Mandanici, 205 F. 3d 519 (2d Cir.2000).


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2005)
    …jurisdiction filed, No. SC02-2711 (Fla. Nov. 25, 2002); Leonard v. State, 892 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), notice invoking discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC05-573 (Fla. Apr. 1, 2005) (denial of rehearing citing Hughes); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (certifying same question as in Hughes in case involving sentence exceeding statutory maximum based on judge’s finding of victim injury), notice invoking discretionary review filed, No. SC03-586 (Fla. Apr. 7, 2003). The issue als…
    1 / 2
  • Windom v. State, 886 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2004)
    …S.Ct. 451, 154 L.Ed.2d 334 (2002), for example, the court noted that “Apprendi is about nothing but procedure — who decides a given question (judge versus jury) and under what standard (preponderance versus reasonable doubt).” In Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), notice invoking discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC03-586 (Fla. Apr. 7, 2003), the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently noted that the Supreme Court itself characterized Apprendi as a procedural rule. Id. at 577 n. 3.…
    1 / 2
  • Burrows v. State, 890 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …), stated in dicta that “Apprendi does not apply retroactively to sentences that were final prior to its issuance.” All of our sister courts have come to the same conclusion. See Enoch v. State, 873 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 829 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Florida, 537 U.S. 1196, 123 S.Ct. 1263, 154 L.Ed.2d 1033 (2003); Hughes v. State, 826 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), review granted, 837 So. 2d…

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