HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK J. ALBRECHTA, ESQUIRE, IN RE ALI Z. FORD, APPELLEE
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Counties must pay attorney's fees for court-appointed counsel in Marchman Act proceedings when counsel is constitutionally required.
[1] Counties are responsible for providing personnel necessary to operate the circuit and county courts, including court-appointed counsel when constitutionally required.
[2] A trial court may require a county to pay attorney's fees for court-appointed counsel representing an indigent when such appointment is constitutionally required and no o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHillsborough County challenged an order requiring it to pay fees for court-appointed counsel in a Marchman Act proceeding. The trial court approved th…
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DAVIS, Judge.
Hillsborough County challenges the circuit court order approving payment by the County of Mark Albrechta’s fees incurred as court-appointed counsel in a Marchman Act proceeding. We affirm.
Section 43.28, Florida Statutes (2000), provides, “The counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facilities, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary to operate the circuit and county courts.”
The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to mean:
[Wlhen appointment of counsel is constitutionally required to represent an indigent, the case cannot proceed without such an appointment; consequently, such counsel is “personnel necessary” to operate the court. In such an instance, the trial court may require the county to pay appropriate attorney’s fees for such representation absent any other statutory provision.
In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 93 (Fla.1980); see also In re R.W., 409 So. 2d 1069, 1070-71 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981).
Accordingly, the issue before us in the instant case is whether appointment of counsel is constitutionally required in Marchman Act proceedings. While Florida’s district courts and supreme court have not directly addressed this question, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that involuntary commitment triggers due process protections. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980); see also § 397.501(8), Fla. Stat. (2000) (including the right to counsel as one of the enumerated rights of respondents in Marchman Act proceed ings). Because due process is implicated, we conclude that a defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel in Marchman Act proceedings. Accordingly, pursuant to section 43.28 and In re D.B., the trial court here was right for the wrong reasons, see Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979); see also Schuette v. State, 822 So. 2d 1275 (Fla.2002), and did not err in requiring the County to pay Albrechta’s fees.
Affirmed.
ALTENBERND, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J„ Concur.
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Chapman v. State, 974 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…ms v. State, 596 So. 2d 758, 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). While Jimmy Ryce proceedings are civil, the constitutional requirement of counsel is imposed because involuntary commitment triggers due process protections. See Hillsborough County v. Albrechta, 841 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (applying right to counsel to Marchman Act proceedings). Thus, the involuntary nature of the proceedings makes the counsel appointment similar to the appointment in criminal proceedings. Because of this, we apply Holmes and conclu…
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K.B. v. Fla. Dep't OF Child. & Families, 202 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…bstance abuse. In the present case, K.B. was given no such notice and no petition was filed. These circumstances also violated KB.’s fundamental due process rights, including KB.’s right to be represented by counsel. Hillsborough Cty. v. Albrechta, 841 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Although we recognize that the Our Kids caseworker and veteran trial judge were experienced enough to recognize passive-aggressive responses by KB.,3 as well as possible signs of impairment, the Legislature has not authorized the…
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T. L. v. F. M. (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…hat civil commitment to a mental hospital "requires due process protection" (first quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 425; and then citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring))); Hillsborough County v. Albrechta, 841 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("Because due process is implicated, we conclude that a defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel in Marchman Act proceedings."); cf. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (explaining that…
Authorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (U.S. 1980)
- In the Interest of D. B. and D. S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980)
- Schuette v. State, 822 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2002)
- Park Rd. Mobile Manor, Inc. v. Breiden, 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- In the Interest of R. W. v. LEE Cnty., 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)