SALVATORE F. ARGENTO, APPELLANT,
v.
CYNTHIA N. ARGENTO, APPELLEE
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Salvatore Argento appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging awards of alimony, equitable distribution, child support, and attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed most of the trial court's decisions but reversed the automatic increase in child support that was scheduled to occur when rehabilitative alimony payments ended.
The court affirmed the equitable distribution and alimony awards. The automatic increase in child support was reversed as erroneous because the trial court provided no specific reason for the increase other than the termination of rehabilitative alimony. The child support calculation itself was affirmed. The court declined to review the attorney's fees issue as nonfinal and nonappealable.
[1] An automatic increase in child support tied solely to the cessation of rehabilitative alimony payments is erroneous.
[2] A trial court's reservation of jurisdiction to ensure a husband's contribution to a wife's attorney's fees and costs, without setting a specific amount, constitutes a non…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The automatic increase in child support under these facts was erroneous.”
Establishes that the trial court erred in imposing an automatic increase in child support without specific articulated reasons.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married in 1989 and have two children born in 1993 and 1995. The trial court awarded the former wife rehabilitative alimony for 36 mo…
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SALCINES, Judge.
Salvatore Argento appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered by the trial court. He raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded rehabilitative and permanent alimony to Cynthia Argento, the former wife; (2) whether the trial court erred in its equitable distribution scheme; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in the award of child support; and (4) whether the trial court erred when it awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the former wife. We affirm, without further discussion, the equitable distribution made by the trial court and the awards of rehabilitative and permanent alimony. As for the remaining issues, we affirm in part and reverse in part the child support award and decline to review the issue of the former wife’s entitlement to a contribution toward her attorney’s fees and costs.
The parties to this appeal were married in 1989 and have two children who were born in 1993 and 1995. Regarding child support, in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage the trial court specifically noted that the former husband would be making rehabilitative alimony payments for thirty-six months and provided that “[a]t the end of the rehabilitative alimony period” the child support obligation of the former husband was to increase by $291.22 per month.
The trial court did not specifically articulate any reason for the increase in child support other than the fact that the payment of rehabilitative alimony would end. The automatic increase in child support under these facts was erroneous. See Lewis v. Poulson, 573 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The award of the automatic increase in child support is reversed.
The former husband also complains about the manner in which the trial court calculated the child support. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its calculations and affirm the child support award in all respects except as to the automatic increase discussed above.
Concerning the trial court’s ruling on the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees, we note that the trial court made the finding that the former wife had the need and the former husband had the ability to contribute to her attorney’s fees and costs. The order concluded, “This court reserves jurisdiction to enter such orders as are required to ensure a contribution by the Husband to the Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees, court cost and suit monies.” This ruling merely established the former wife’s entitlement to fees; it did not set the amount of the fees and costs. This portion of the judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1376-77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We lack jurisdiction to review the issue of entitlement and, accordingly, deny review of this point on appeal.
Accordingly, the final judgment of dissolution is reversed as to the award of the automatic increase in child support; review of the former wife’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs is denied; and in all other respects the final judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and review denied in part.
FULMER and STRINGER, JJ„ • Concur.
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Hitt v. Homes & Land Brokers, Inc., 993 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ew stated in rule 9.130 must be limited to their plain meaning. The rule does not authorize judges to enlarge its provisions to permit review of nonfinal orders not specified within its provisions.” (citations omitted)); see also Argento v. Argento, 842 So. 2d 182, 183-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (denying review of a portion of the judgment that was nonfinal and nonappealable). Because rule 9.130(a)(3) does not authorize the appeal of a nonfinal order on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the appeal as to th…
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Perez v. Perez, 882 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…e record that the former husband complained to the trial judge about the fact that this orally-stated rationale was not included in the judgment. . The fact that the 10% threshold would be met distinguishes the present case from Argento v. Argento, 842 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).…
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Kuttas v. Anne R. Ritter, 879 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…torney’s fees for contempt and bad faith. The trial court, however, reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees. An order determining entitlement to fees without setting an amount is a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Argento v. Argento, 842 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We would observe, however, that we have some reservations about both orders. As to the contempt, we recognize that Mr. Kuttas technically violated the order compelling him…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Lewis v. Poulson, 573 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)