A.J.D., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile's community control revocation was reversed because the trial court relied solely on hearsay testimony from a probation officer without introducing non-hearsay evidence, such as school records that were available but never formally admitted.
Hearsay alone is insufficient to revoke community control. The probation officer's testimony without non-hearsay corroboration was insufficient, and the school records were not properly admitted because the probation officer was neither the custodian of records nor qualified to testify regarding their preparation or reliability.
[1] Hearsay evidence is admissible in community control revocation proceedings, but it cannot be the sole basis for revocation.
[2] A probation officer's testimony regarding a defendant's alleged violation, based solely on information from external records not admitted into evidence, is insufficient t…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear that hearsay is admissible in revocation proceedings, however, it cannot be the sole basis for revocation.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that while hearsay has some role in revocation proceedings, it cannot stand alone as the sole evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.J.D. was sentenced to community control with a requirement to attend school. The State alleged he failed to attend school and sought revocation. At …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
A.J.D. appeals the revocation of his community control claiming the trial court erred by basing the revocation solely on hearsay evidence. We agree and reverse.
A.J.D. was originally sentenced to community control. Subsequently, the State filed an affidavit of violation of community control alleging that A.J.D. failed to attend school as required by the conditions of his community control. At the revocation hearing, AJ.D’s probation officer testified A.J.D. failed to attend school every day. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The probation officer stated that she had the school records with her. The State, however, failed to move these records into evidence or introduce any other non-hearsay evidence. The trial court found A. J.D. violated his community control and ordered A.J.D. into a residential treatment program.
A.J.D. asserts error because the State failed to introduce non-hearsay evidence to support its affidavit. The State contends the trial court’s order should be affirmed because the school records were admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. See § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2002).
It is clear that hearsay is admissible in revocation proceedings, however, it cannot be the sole basis for revocation. See Hall v. State, 744 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Therefore, the probation officer’s testimony alone is insufficient to revoke A.J.D.’s community control.
AJ.D.’s probation officer had no personal knowledge as to whether A.J.D. attended school. Although the probation officer testified that she reviewed the school records, the State did not move these records into evidence. See Adams v. State, 521 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)(probation officer’s testimony based on review of probation department’s records was insufficient to sustain revocation order).
Regardless, even if the State moved to admit the school records as a business record exception, the probation officer was not the custodian of records nor was she qualified to testify as to the preparation or the reliability of the records. See E.C. v. State, 675 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(to have records admitted under the business record exception, school official who either had personal knowledge of defendant’s suspension or who was custodian of records should have testified); Hogan v. State, 583 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)(court held that reports admitted at probation hearing were insufficient to support admission under the business record exception).
Accordingly, because hearsay evidence alone is insufficient to establish a violation of community control, we reverse the revocation order. Reversed.
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Gonzales v. State, 909 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. Martin Gonzales appeals an order of revocation of probation. We affirm. Defendant-appellant Gonzales argues that the revocation of his probation was based entirely on hearsay evidence and must be reversed. See A.J.D. v. State, 842 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Assuming that point was sufficiently preserved in the trial court, we disagree with the defendant’s characterization of the evidence presented. It consisted of a sufficient amount of direct evidence in addition to hearsay. The…
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D.D. v. State, 271 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
Authorities Cited
- Adams v. State, 521 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Hogan v. State, 583 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Hall v. State, 744 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- E.C. v. State, 675 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)