TARONN KENARD BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Taronn Kenard Brown appeals his second-degree murder conviction and life sentence as a habitual felony offender with a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment under Florida's ten-twenty-life statute. The appellate court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, holding that the statute expressly authorizes mandatory minimum terms of life imprisonment for enumerated felonies committed with a firearm resulting in death.
The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence supported the conviction. The court also held that a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment is a permissible sentence under the ten-twenty-life statute because the statute expressly characterizes such sentences as mandatory minimum terms and the legislative intent was to impose mandatory minimum sentences for violent crimes committed with firearms.
[1] A motion for judgment of acquittal is properly denied when the evidence is legally sufficient to convict.
[2] A life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment is an authorized sentence under the ten-twenty-life statute when a firearm is discharged during the com…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.”
The statutory language of the ten-twenty-life statute authorizing sentence ranges for enumerated felonies committed with a firearm.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a habitual felony offender with a mandatory minimum…
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PER CURIAM.
Teronn Kenard Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for second degree murder. We affirm.
Defendant-appellant Brown argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict him. We conclude that the motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied, and affirm the conviction on authority of Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla.1996), and Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
The defendant argues that there is a sentencing error. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment as a habitual felony offender, with a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment under the ten-twenty-life law.
The defendant argues that a mandatory minimum term of life is not an authorized sentence under the ten-twenty-life statute. The statute provides, in part, that any person who is convicted of an enumerated felony (which includes murder) “and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a ‘firearm’ ... and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.” § 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).1
The defendant argues that under the quoted language, the court may impose a life sentence, but not a mandatory minimum sentence of life. We disagree.
When the ten-twenty-life statute is read as a whole, the statute expressly characterizes these sentences as mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. Id. § 775.087(2)(c). Further, one of the whereas clauses that was part of the ten-twenty-life Act stated, “it is the intent of the Legislature that criminals who use guns to commit violent crimes be vigorous prosecuted and that the state demand that minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment be imposed pursuant to this act....” Ch. 99-12, at 537, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). It follows that it was permissible for the trial court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment with a mandatory mini mum sentence of life.2
Affirmed.
. The crime date was March 30, 2000.
. Since there is no parole from a life sentence, see Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), it makes no practical difference at the present time whether the life sentence is accompanied by a mandatory minimum sentence of life.
If in the future, however, the legislature should decide to change the law to allow parole or some form of , conditional release on a life sentence, then the mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment would presumably operate to preclude any such release.
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Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…ife. The court doubted that DOC would require him to serve even 25 years in prison. Actually, the court failed to perceive that with an HFO life sentence defendant would not be eligible for parole. § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991); Brown v. State, 843 So. 2d 930, 932 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citing Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) and recognizing there is no parole from a life sentence); Brown v. State, 585 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Fl…
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Mulazim M. Yasin v. State, 896 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…sentence. I think the trial judge’s mistake was in viewing the statute as creating an inflated statutory maximum, whereas, in fact, what the legislature did was to authorize inflation of the statutory minimum mandatory sentence. In Brown v. State, 843 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), the court allowed a mandatory minimum term of life in prison to be imposed under section 775.087(2)(a)3. The defendant argued that the court could impose a life sentence but not a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. The…
Authorities Cited
- Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996)
- Rodrigo Quintana v. Quintana, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)