MARILYN TOBKIN, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD A. TOBKIN, APPELLEE
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A wife sought a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's disqualification of her chosen counsel based on the lead attorney's prior service on a Florida Bar grievance committee that had investigated the husband. The appellate court granted the petition, holding that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not support disqualification under these facts and that denying a client's choice of counsel causes irreparable harm.
The court held that disqualification of the counsel was not required under the Rules of Professional Conduct given the facts of the case, and therefore the trial court's disqualification order was improper. The denial of the right to choose one's own lawyer causes irreparable harm.
[1] Disqualification of counsel is tested against the standards imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[2] Denial of the right to choose one's own lawyer is deemed to cause irreparable harm.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order involving the disqualification of counsel must be tested against the standards imposed by [the] Rules of Professional Conduct.”
Establishes the legal standard for reviewing disqualification orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife's attorney, Alan Braverman, had served on a Florida Bar Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee that reviewed a grievance against th…
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[*962] PER CURIAM.
The wife has filed a petition for writ of certiorari concerning the trial court’s order that disqualified the Law Offices of Brav-erman and Rossi from representing her in this dissolution proceeding. She argues that the trial court deviated from the essential requirements of law in disqualifying her counsel and that she will suffer irreparable harm by being denied the right to have counsel of her choice. We agree and grant the petition.
The husband filed a motion for disqualification and alleged that Alan Braverman had served on a Florida Bar Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee that had reviewed a grievance against him. He further alleged that Mr. Braverman had been privy to unspecified confidential financial and psychological documentation during that proceeding, and that he had reviewed records and files belonging to the husband that had remained in the marital home. Mr. Braverman disputed all of the husband’s allegations and indicated that he had no knowledge or recollection of having reviewed any grievance against the husband. Mr. Braverman checked with the Florida Bar and found that the only grievance that had been filed against the husband had been dismissed.
The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. The court articulated the undisputed facts as follows:
There was a grievance proceeding. The wife’s attorney was on the committee. The husband was the subject matter of the investigation. The husband produced documents to the committee. A member of the committee now represents the wife.
The court trained the legal issue as whether a member of a grievance committee, who investigated a claim against an attorney, should be permitted to represent that attorney’s spouse in a dissolution proceeding. The court granted the motion and disqualified the firm.
“An order involving the disqualification of counsel must be tested against the standards imposed by [the] Rules of Professional Conduct.” City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Enter. Leasing Co., 654 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We find nothing in the rules that would require the disqualification of Mr. Braverman’s firm given the facts of this case. We have previously held that “the denial of the right to choose one’s own lawyer is deemed to cause irreparable harm....” Id. We therefore grant the writ and quash the order of disqualification.
STONE, FARMER and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Alliedsignal Recovery Tr. v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 934 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…mensely unusual remedy.” Whitener v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 901 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). An order disqualifying counsel “ ‘must be tested against the standards imposed by [the] Rules of Professional Conduct.’ ” Tobkin v. Tobkin, 843 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting City of Lauderdale Lakes, 654 So. 2d at 646); accord Ray v. Stuckey, 491 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Cazares v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 429 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Measured again…
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Orbsat Corp. v. Seifert (S.D. Fla. 2022)…isqualifying counsel must be tested against the standards imposed by the Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct. See AlliedSignal Recovery Tr. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Tobkin v. Tobkin, 843 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (denying disqualification); Cazares v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 429 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (denying disqualification). III. ANALYSIS Defendant argues that Mr. Phillips is subject to disqualificati…
Authorities Cited
- City OF Lauderdale Lakes v. Enter. Leasing Co., 654 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)