GARLIN A. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant Smith appealed his conviction for sale or delivery of cocaine following a jury trial. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court erred in denying Smith's motion for mistrial when the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by commenting on the lack of defense evidence, particularly suggesting that the defendant had a burden to present evidence refuting the state's identification testimony.
Yes. The trial court erred in denying the mistrial motion. The prosecutor's statement that 'Nobody testified he wasn't the guy' impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The error was not harmless, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
[1] A prosecutor's comment during closing argument that "Nobody testified he wasn't the guy" impermissibly suggests the defendant has a burden to present evidence refuting th…
[2] A prosecutor's comment during closing argument that "Nobody testified he wasn't the guy" constitutes an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state cannot comment on a defendant's failure to produce evidence ... because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the burden of introducing evidence”
Establishes the fundamental principle that prosecutors may not shift the burden of proof by commenting on absence of defense evidence
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn undercover officer testified that he purchased cocaine from appellant Smith. Smith presented no evidence at trial. During closing argument, the pro…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Comment On Failure To Testify cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of his conviction, following a jury trial, for sale or delivery of cocaine. Because the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial made in response to comments by the prosecutor during closing argument improperly suggesting that appellant had the burden to present evidence refuting the state’s identification testimony, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
The only person who offered testimony establishing that appellant was guilty of sale or delivery of cocaine was the undercover officer who claimed to have purchased cocaine from appellant. Appellant presented no evidence. During closing argument, the prosecutor said:
A reasonable doubt can come from the evidence, a conflict in the evidence and a lack of evidence. From that [sic] testimony from that witness stand there is no reasonable doubt that was put forward to you today from that witness stand that he didn’t commit the crime. Nobody testified he wasn’t the guy.
(Emphasis added.) Counsel for appellant immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing that the state had commented on appellant’s failure to testify and had shifted the burden of proof. The trial court denied the motion. This was error. In light of the evidence presented, the statement, “Nobody testified he wasn’t the guy,” can only be taken as intended to suggest, impermissibly, that appellant had some burden to present evidence refuting the state’s identification testimony. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla.1991) (noting that “the state cannot comment on a defendant’s failure to produce evidence ... because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the burden of introducing evidence”); Jackson v. State, 832 So. 2d 773, 777-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding that the prosecutor’s question during closing argument implying that no evidence had been presented to counter an officer’s identification testimony impermis-sibly shifted the burden of proof); Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295, 1296-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding that the prosecutor’s question during closing argument asking whether there was “anything showing that [the defendant] didn’t make that sale” impermissibly shifted the burden of proof). It is equally clear that the statement constituted an impermissible comment on appellant’s failure to testify. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla.2000) (concluding that a prosecutor’s comment that “there was nothing in the direct or cross examination of any witness who testified that pointed to any other person being involved other than ... this defendant” constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s failure to testify); State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla.1985) (noting that “[a]ny comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant’s failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged”); Shelton, 654 So. 2d at 1297. Having carefully reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we are unable to accept the state’s argument that the error was harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
Appellant also complains that the trial court improperly prohibited cross-examination of two police officers regarding prior reprimands. We conclude that the trial court’s decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
ALLEN, C.J., WEBSTER and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Watts v. State, 921 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ncidents involved in this case, namely Williams and Watts, and only Williams testified, the prosecutor’s question, “Did you hear anybody else testify to dispute the officer’s story?” could refer only to Watts’ failure to testify. See Smith v. State, 843 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The cases the state- has cited in its brief are all factually distinguishable. “[C]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair tria…
-
Baucham v. State, 881 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…e submitted, the paperwork was provided by the officers, and the officers were not reprimanded or disciplined in any way. The trial judge made a close relevance call, which I would affirm because there was no abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 843 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting cross-examination of two police officers regarding prior reprimands); Forte v. State, 662 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (ruling that the trial co…
-
Bell v. State, 33 So. 3d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…s guilt was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent where appellant was the only individual capable of refuting the witness’s testimony); see also Watts v. State, 921 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (same); Smith v. State, 843 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding the State’s comment that “[n]o-body testified he wasn’t the guy” was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the State’s evidence…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2000)
- Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1985)
- Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Izel Jackson v. State, 832 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)