GROVER DOUGLAS MAGGARD, APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA A. MAGGARD, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-05-07
No. 2D01-4402
WHATLEY and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.
844 So. 2d 710 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A husband challenges the equitable distribution in a dissolution of marriage judgment, arguing the written judgment exceeds the parties' oral settlement agreement. The court affirms most of the judgment but reverses the award requiring the husband to pay the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy, finding it was merely a funding source for the $60,000 equitable distribution, not an additional asset award.


Holding

The court affirmed the award of the $2,700 alimony arrearage and the $23,000 attorney's fees as they were not part of the $60,000 settlement amount, but reversed the award of the $9,500 insurance policy cash value because it was intended only as a funding source for the $60,000 equitable distribution, not an additional award to the wife.


Headnotes

[1] A written final judgment of dissolution of marriage must conform to the parties' oral settlement agreement.

[2] A trial court may err by including provisions in a final judgment that were not contemplated in the parties' settlement agreement.

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Key Quotes

“the parties never contemplated in their settlement agreement that the $9500 would be an additional award to the wife. Rather, it was simply one source of funds the husband intended to expend to help meet the $60,000 obligation.”

Establishes the court's interpretation that the insurance policy was a funding mechanism for the $60,000 equitable distribution, not a separate asset award

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties orally settled their divorce, agreeing the husband would pay the wife $60,000 in equitable distribution within sixty days. The husband sta…

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Opinion of the Court
KELLY, Judge.

[*711] KELLY, Judge.

Grover Douglas Maggard (the husband) challenges the equitable distribution portions of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. 'He argues that the written final judgment does not conform to the parties’ oral settlement. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in awarding Barbara Maggard (the wife) alimony arrearage and the cash value of an insurance policy. We affirm the final judgment with the exception of the award to the wife of the cash value of the insurance policy.

Upon a recess in the trial, the parties announced settlement of the case on all outstanding issues. The settlement called for the husband to pay to the wife $60,000 in equitable distribution. Payment of this amount was to be made within sixty days of the date of the hearing. Despite this sixty-day provision, the husband expressed that he could pay $50,000 within ten days and that he would cash out a life insurance policy with a value of $9500 to fulfill the majority of the $60,000 equitable distribution obligation. There was also some discussion concerning $2700 which the husband owed the wife in alimony arrears.

The wife’s counsel prepared a proposed final judgment, which the trial court entered over the husband’s objection. The final judgment required the husband to pay to the wife the cash surrender value of the $9500 life insurance policy, $2700 in alimony arrearage, $60,000 in equitable distribution, and $23,000 of the wife’s attorney’s fees, for a total financial obligation of $95,200. Upon entry of the final judgment, the husband filed a motion for rehearing noting his objections to the final judgment, which the trial court denied.

The husband argues that the final judgment creates a financial obligation that is $12,000 in excess of that contained in the oral agreement. He argues that the $2700 which he owed in alimony arrearage was part of the $60,000 settlement. However, the transcript of the hearing and the husband’s own proposed final judgment refute this. The husband’s proposed final judgment requires the husband to pay $2700 in alimony arrearage in addition to $60,000 in equitable distribution and $23,000 of the wife’s attorney’s fees.

Although the final judgment correctly reflects the inclusion of the $2700, it must still be reversed in part because it erroneously requires the husband to pay $9500, the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy, in addition to the $2700 alimony arrearage and the $60,000 equitable distribution. The parties never contemplated in their settlement agreement that the $9500 would be an additional award to the wife. Rather, it was simply one source of funds the husband intended to expend to help meet the $60,000 obligation.

Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment which awards the wife $9500. The final judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

WHATLEY and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Antonacci v. Juliana Antonacci, 146 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …PER CURIAM. The trial court erred in failing to conform the written order on rehearing to its oral pronouncement at the hearing on the issue of the parties’ respective pensions. See Maggard v. Maggard, 844 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Leonard v. Leonard, 613 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We therefore reverse those portions of the order on rehearing that address the parties’ pensions and we remand with…

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