ETHELYN GARSED, A SINGLE WOMAN, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
WILLIAM SUGARMAN, LOUIS KARASIK, AND R. P. BEAM, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR
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Ethelyn Garsed sued William Sugarman, Louis Karasik, and R. P. Beam for malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and conspiracy to extort money through threats. The trial court sustained a demurrer to her declaration. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that conspiracy can be both a civil and criminal offense under Florida law, and that a person injured by a conspiracy has a right of action against the conspirators.
The declaration states a cause of action. Conspiracy is both a civil and criminal offense under Florida law. While the state's statute on conspiracy (Section 5400, Rev. Gen. Stats. of 1920) primarily defines conspiracy as a crime, it does not abrogate its civil aspect. Therefore, when a conspiracy is conceived and executed and results in private injury, the injured party has a right of action against the conspirators.
“It would seem, therefore, if a conspiracy as contemplated under our statute is conceived and executed and a private injury results the one so injured would have a right of action against the conspirators.”
Establishes the core holding that injured parties can bring civil actions for conspiracy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEthelyn Garsed filed a declaration containing three counts against Sugarman, Karasik, and Beam: one for malicious prosecution, one for conspiracy, and…
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Terrell, C. J.
The declaration herein is embraced in three counts. The first count' is predicated on malicious prosecution, the second count on an action of conspiracy, and the third count on a conspiracy to exact money by means of threats to accuse and prosecute for crime. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained and final judgment was entered. Writ of error was prosecuted from that final judgment.
The sole question presented here for our consideration is whether or not the declaration states a cause of action.
The briefs of counsel and the record raise some very interesting questions on various legal aspects of conspiracy particularly as to whether or not under the law of this State it is both a civil and criminal offense. In its inception, though limited in nature, it was a civil wrong and a criminal offense. Our statute, Section 5400, Rev. Gen. Stats, of 1920 (Section 7541, Comp, Gen. Laws of 1927) defines conspiracy and materially enlarges its scope as a crime over the common law conception of the qet but it does not attempt to modify or abrogate its civil aspect. It would seem, therefore, if a conspiracy as contemplated under our statute is conceived and executed and a private injury results the one so injured would have a right of action against the conspirators. Quinn v. Leathern (1901) A. C. 495 appears to be the leading case on the question. See also the “Law of Conspiracy” by Harrison, a splendid monograph treating* the subject of civil and criminal conspiracy. We do not undertake to set out such facts or circumstances as would constitute conspiracy in any of its phases. The facts in the particular case determine this.
This cause is reversed on authority of Cummings Machine Works v. J. D. Clarke and J. A. Johnson, 89 Fla. 383, 105 So. R. 100, 116 So. R. 72, 870.
Reversed.
Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur. Whitfield,. P. J., and Strum and B-uford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Regan v. Davis, 97 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957)…ent civil action was unknown at common law as well as in this country. Some respectable authority is cited for this assertion. We do not feel that the question is open in this state however since it was held in the affirmative in Garsed v. Sugarman, 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 157; Quigg v. Helm, 119 Fla. 693, 161 So. 55. Hunter Lyon, Inc., v. W. H. Walker, Fla., 11 So. 2d 176, opinion filed December 11, 1942. A comprehensive discussion of this question will be found in Chapter XVI, Carson’s Revised Edition Flori…
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Carlton W. Faulk v. Allen, 152 Fla. 413 (Fla. 1943)…l action was unknown at common law as well as in this country. Some respectable authority is cited for this assertion. We do not feel that the question is open in this state however since it was held in the-affirmative in Garsed v. Sugarman, et al., 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 157; Quigg v. Helm, et al., 119 Fla. 693, 161 So. 55. Hunter Lyon, Inc., v. W. H. Walker, et al., 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. (2nd) 176, opinion filed December 11, 1942. A comprehensive discussion of this question will be found in Chapter XVI, Cars…
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Patten v. Daoud, 152 Fla. 448 (Fla. 1943)…that the act conspired to be done or the manner of its doing was unlawful. In this brief, respondents say that they patterned their declaration after the declaration in Stewart Land Company v. Perkins, 290 Mo. 194, 234 S.W. 653; Garsed v. Sugarman, 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 147; and Harford v. Graves, 102 Fla. 835, 136 So. 620. It is fundamental that the allegations of a declaration for civil conspiracy must charge a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to…
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- Cummings Machine Works v. Clark, 89 Fla. 383 (Fla. 1925)