STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
BENNIE DEMPS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Fla. | 2003-04-03
Nos. SC01-1301, SC02-302
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
846 So. 2d 457 Florida Supreme Court (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court consolidated appeals concerning attorney's fees awarded to counsel representing a death row inmate during proceedings on his final death warrant. The Court reversed the fee award to one attorney as exceeding statutory limits, affirmed the award to another attorney, and reversed awards to a co-counsel and expert witnesses due to lack of statutory authority.


Holding

The Court reversed Schaefer's fee award and reduced it to $14,220.59 at the $100 hourly rate, affirmed Salmon's award of $18,483.31 at the $100 rate, and reversed the awards to Bernstein and the expert witnesses for lack of statutory authority. The Court rejected constitutional challenges to the $100 statutory rate.


Headnotes

[1] Statutory hourly rates for attorney's fees are constitutional as applied when the circumstances do not present an unconstitutional application.

[2] Awards of attorney's fees to counsel appointed to represent a defendant during the pendency of a death warrant are governed by specific statutory provisions.

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Key Quotes

“the Court's orders of May 23, May 25, and May 27, 2000, requiring Salmon to remain as Demps' counsel on appeal in order to prevent any unnecessary delay in the execution of the death warrant”

Establishes the unique circumstances justifying the fee awards and the Court's specific requirements for maintaining counsel continuity

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Facts & Procedural History

Bennie Demps was represented by multiple attorneys during proceedings concerning his final death warrant. George F. Schaefer was appointed as registry…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

These are consolidated appeals arising from the representation of Bennie Demps during the pendency of his final death warrant. The State appeals from orders awarding attorney’s fees to George F. Schaefer and Bill Salmon, as well as awards of fees to Stephen N. Bernstein, Salmon’s counsel in a hearing on the attorney’s fee dispute, and witnesses Robert A. Harper and William B. Sheppard, who testified as expert witnesses for Salmon. Salmon cross-appeals the attorney’s fee award, claiming that he was entitled to be compensated at a higher hourly rate under the circumstances of the case. The Court, having reviewed the briefs of the parties and amicus curiae, and entertained oral argument, orders as foEows.

In case no. SC01-1301, the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to George F. Schaefer in the amount of $26,180.00 is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter an order awarding fees and costs of $14,220.59, corresponding to the $100 hourly rate for fees specified in sections 27.703 and 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (1999). The portion of the order finding the statutory rate of compensation to be unconstitutional as applied to Schaefer is also reversed, pursuant to this Court’s application of the criteria in Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.1986). See also Olive v. Maas, 811 So. 2d 644 (Fla.2002).

In ease no. SC02-302, the award of attorney’s fees and costs to Bill Salmon in the amount of $18,483.31 is affirmed, pursuant to sections 27.710(6) and 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (1999). The order is also affirmed as to Salmon’s cross-appeal of the $100 per hour rate of compensation, pursuant to Makemson, Olive, and Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925 (Fla.2002).

We note that on appeal, the State does not contest the number of hours expended by both Schaefer and Salmon, and agrees with the payment of attorney’s fees as reduced to the hourly rate of $100 as long as we make clear the statutory authority for these amounts. Accordingly, we approve the award of fees both to Schaefer as registry counsel under section 27.710 and to Salmon as assistant counsel under section 27.711(4), and expressly recognize the unique circumstances of this case, in particular the Court’s orders of May 23, May 25, and May 27, 2000, requiring Salmon to remain as Demps’ counsel on appeal in order to prevent any unnecessary delay in the execution of the death warrant.

In case no. SC02-302, the award of attorney’s fees of $6,250.00 to Stephen N. Bernstein is reversed based on the lack of statutory authority for the award, and the award of expert witness fees of $2,700.77 to Robert A. Harper and $2,706.52 to William B. Sheppard is reversed pursuant to Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.1985).

The requests for appellate attorney’s fees for representation in the instant proceedings in this Court are denied.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs. v. Freeman, 921 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2006)
    …, including the ceilings on fees in section 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (2005). Some attorneys regard com [*604] pensation under these caps to be inadequate under the circumstances of capital postconviction representation. See, e.g., State v. Demps, 846 So. 2d 457, 457 (Fla.2003) (addressing appeal of fee award by attorney who claimed he was entitled to compensation at rate higher than specified in section 27.711(4)). Further, for the registry to be a viable system for competent postconviction representation,…

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