JOSEPHINE LOCKLEAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Josephine Locklear appeals the summary denial of her Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, holding that although Locklear raised a potentially viable claim that counsel failed to advise her of the voluntary intoxication defense, she failed to demonstrate prejudice because her taped confession established the specific intent required for the crimes.
Although Locklear potentially stated a valid claim of ineffective assistance regarding counsel's failure to advise of the voluntary intoxication defense, she failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Her taped confession, in which she admitted entering the house with intent to steal, demonstrated the specific intent necessary for both offenses, making it impossible to show a reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted from raising the voluntary intoxication defense.
[1] A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the outco…
[2] The defense of voluntary intoxication may be available for offenses requiring specific intent, even if the defendant could distinguish right from wrong.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to state a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”
Establishes the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington that applies to ineffective assistance claims.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLocklear was convicted of grand theft and burglary. She informed counsel that she was intoxicated at the time of the offenses and later filed a postco…
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[*544] FULMER, Judge.
Josephine Locklear appeals the summary denial of her motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In her motion, Locklear raised five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm and write to discuss one claim.
Locklear alleged that her counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her that the defense of voluntary intoxication was available for the offenses of grand theft and burglary. She claimed that she informed her counsel that she was intoxicated at the time she committed the offenses, thus presenting a legally sufficient claim. See Straitwell v. State, 834 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Foster v. State, 825 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
The trial court denied this claim, relying on psychological reports that indicated Locklear could distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offenses. These reports do not conclusively refute her claim because while she may have been able to distinguish right from wrong, she may not have been able to form the specific intent necessary to commit the crimes charged. See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932 (Fla.2002).
However, upon reviewing other portions of the record attached to the trial court’s order and Locklear’s motion, we conclude that Locklear has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s alleged failure. In order to state a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and' (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The record indicates that Locklear made a taped confession in which she admitted to law enforcement that she entered the house with the intent to steal valuable items, and Locklear admits that this confession was introduced by the State at trial. This confession refutes Locklear’s claim that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure because the confession demonstrates that she had the specific intent to commit both offenses. Even if Locklear had advanced the voluntary intoxication defense, a reasonable probability does not exist that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Therefore, Locklear’s claim is without merit, and we affirm the trial court’s order of denial.
Affirmed.
DAVIS and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.
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Rudolf v. State, 851 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ry intoxication as a defense and for failure to request the voluntary intoxication instruction. At the time the crimes occurred, January 4,1999, voluntary intoxication was a defense to the specific intent crime of grand theft. See Locklear v. State, 847 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Spivey v. State, 680 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Ch. 99-174, § 1, at 968, Laws of Fla. (creating section 775.051, Florida Statutes, which abrogates voluntary intoxication as a defense, effective October 1,1999). A review of…1 / 2
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Barboza v. Crosby, 909 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…al, demonstrates that he had the specific intent to commit these two offenses. Thus, even if Barboza had advanced a voluntary intoxication defense, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. See Locklear v. State, 847 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2002)
- Straitwell v. State, 834 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Foster v. State, 825 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)