ROBERT O. POWELL AND ANN S. POWELL, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM MARKHAM, JUDITH M. FINK, AND JAMES A. ZINGALE, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 2003-06-18
No. 4D02-3754
GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur., STONE, J., dissents with opinion.
847 So. 2d 1105 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2003) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Powells challenged the denial of the Save Our Homes constitutional cap on property tax assessment increases, arguing they were entitled to the cap despite never filing a homestead exemption application. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that entitlement to the cap is not limited to those who have actually applied for and received a homestead exemption, but extends to all homeowners who qualify for one.


Holding

The court held that entitlement to the Save Our Homes cap is not limited to homeowners who have actually applied for and been granted a homestead exemption, but includes all homeowners who qualify for and are thus entitled to a homestead exemption, regardless of whether they have filed the required application.


Headnotes

[1] Entitlement to the Save Our Homes cap applies to all homeowners who qualify for and are entitled to a homestead exemption, not solely those who have already applied for a…

[2] The purpose of the Save Our Homes cap is to encourage the preservation of homestead property.

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Key Quotes

“All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under Section 6 of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just value as of January 1 of the year following the effective date of this amendment.”

The Save Our Homes constitutional provision that is central to the case; the word 'entitled' becomes the pivotal term of interpretation.

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Facts & Procedural History

The Powells purchased their Fort Lauderdale home in 1990 and continuously occupied it as their primary residence. In 2001, they received notice of pro…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The Powells filed suit against the Bro-ward County Property Appraiser, the Bro-ward County Revenue Collection Division, and the state Department of Revenue (“the Defendants”) challenging the failure to apply the Article VII, Section 4 value assessment cap (“Save Our Homes” cap) to the increase in the assessed value of their home. The Defendants won a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Powells appeal.

The Powells purchased their Fort Laud-erdale home in 1990. Since the time of the purchase, it has been their primary residence and they have occupied the home continuously. In 2001, the Powells received notice that their ad valorem property taxes would increase more than $10,000. On September 17, 2001, they filed their first application for homestead exemption on the property. Their homestead exemption application was approved for tax year 2001.

The Save Our Homes provision states:

[a]ll persons entitled to a homestead exemption under Section 6 of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just value as of January 1 of the year following the effective date of this amendment.

Fla. Const, art. VII, § 4(c) (amended 1998).

The Powells contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they could not seek the Save Our Homes cap. They argue that the cap applies to persons “entitled to” a homestead exemption, and they were entitled to a homestead exemption from the time they bought the home, even though they never filed papers. The Defendants argue that entitlement to the homestead exemption is governed by statute, which requires that an application be made by March 1 of the year for which the taxpayer intends to claim the exemption, and the failure to timely file results in a waiver for the given year. Accordingly, the resolution of this case depends on the meaning of the word “entitled” as used in the Save Our Homes provision.

The fundamental object in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the framers and adopters, and constitutional provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as to fulfill this intention rather than to defeat it. In construing particular constitutional provisions, the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be remedied should be kept in mind by the courts, and the provisions should be so interpreted as to accomplish, rather than to defeat such objects.

State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130, 135 (Fla.1970); accord Metropolitan Dade County v. City of Miami, 396 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla.1980).

The purpose of the Save Our Homes cap “is to encourage the preservation of homestead property in the face of ever increasing opportunities for real estate development, and rising property values and assessments.” Smith v. Welton, 710 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 02-28 (2002). With that in mind, we conclude that entitlement to a homestead exemption, for the purpose of seeking application of the Save Our Homes cap, is not limited to homeowners that have actually applied for and been granted a homestead exemption, but includes all homeowners who qualify for and thus are entitled to a homestead exemption.

We reject Defendants’ argument that Horne v. Markham, 288 So. 2d 196 (Fla.1973) is controlling here. As set forth in Home, a property owner seeking a homestead exemption must comply with requirements “prescribed by law,” such as filing: a timely application. 288 So. 2d at 200. That is not the issue before this court. The Powells do not seek a homestead exemption for the year 2000; they seek application of the Save Our Homes cap to the increase in the assessed value of their home in that year. Thus, their compliance with the filing requirements of section 196.011 is irrelevant here. See § 196.011, Fla. Stat. (2002).

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to reinstate the Powells’ complaint.

GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur. STONE, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent
STONE, J.,

STONE, J.,

dissenting.

I would affirm. In my judgment, the Powells do not qualify for “save our homes” treatment for the 2001 tax year because they did not timely apply for a homestead exemption.

While the benefits of article VII, section 4(e) of the Florida Constitution apply to all persons “entitled to” a homestead exemption under section 6, section 196.011(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that the homestead exemption is available only to those who apply for it by March 1. The statute also states that failure to timely file results in a waiver. Although referencing a different provision of article VII, the supreme court, in Horne v. Markham, 288 So. 2d 196 (Fla.1973), rejected the assertion that article VII, section 6 creates an absolute right to the exemption, recognizing that section 6

clearly provides that taxpayers who otherwise qualify shall be granted an exemption only “upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by law”. In this case, of course, “the manner prescribed by law” is set forth in Chapter 196, Florida Statutes ....

Id. at 199. I would not impose a more restrictive reading of article VII here.

By failing to timely apply for the exemption, the Powells waived their right to any constitutional tax benefits they would otherwise be entitled to because they faded to establish their right thereto, “in the manner prescribed by law.”


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Citator

Cited By

  • Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2004)
    …being granted the homestead exemption. We conclude that the cap is tied to the grant of a homestead exemption, and therefore quash the decision below, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion. See Powell v. Markham, 847 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).1 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Robert and Ann Powell purchased a home in Fort Lauderdale in 1990. They [*280] have continuously used the home as their primary residence since its purchase, but did not apply for a homes…
  • Thomas v. Smith, 882 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …998 through 2001. In all other respects, we affirm the circuit court’s order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SILBERMAN and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . But see Powell v. Markham, 847 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted by Zingale v. Powell, 860 So. 2d 980 (Fla.2003) (holding that property owners who had not applied for but were otherwise qualified to obtain a homestead tax exemption on their residence were entitled to the application…

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