J. E. CRUMP, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
SNIVELY-GIDDINGS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Plaintiff in error brought suit on common counts against a construction company for $7,000 in alleged debts. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the writ of error, finding that the assignments of error were entirely without merit and the writ was prosecuted solely for purposes of delay.
The Court quashed the writ of error, finding the assignments of error entirely without merit and that the only advantage to plaintiff in error would be delay incident to appellate review. Although the statute authorized a penalty not exceeding ten percent, the Court exercised discretion not to impose the penalty.
“It appears to the Court that the assignments of error are entirely without merit and that the only advantage which could accrue to the plaintiff in error was that advantage which might accrue by reason of delay necessary incident to bring a case by writ of error to an appellate court”
Establishes the Court's finding that the appeal lacked substantive merit and was pursued solely for delaying advantage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff in error sued defendant in error (Snively-Giddings Construction Company) on six common counts, including for goods sold, work and materials …
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Per Curiam.
In this case suit was brought on common counts, as follows: ‘ ‘ 1. Money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for goods bargained and sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. “2. Work done and materials furnished by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request. “3. Money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant. “4. Money paid by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request. ‘ ‘ 5. Money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff. ‘ ‘ 6. Money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them.” The damage alleged was Seven Thousand ($7,000.00) Dollars. Bill of particulars was attached to the declaration. There were a number of pleas filed.
There were seven (7) assignments of error filed by the plaintiff in error and one cross assignment of error filed by the defendant in error. Briefs have been presented by both sides. Motion has been filed by the defendant in error to' quash the writ of error under the provisions of Sec. 2920, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, Sec. 4639, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, because as it is alleged, “The writ of error in this case was prosecuted merely for the purpose of delay.” It appears to the Court that the assignments of error are entirely without merit and that the only advantage which could accrue to the plaintiff in error was that advantage which might accrue by reason of delay necessary incident to bring a case by writ of error to an appellate court, the' docket of which is so congested that cases may not be reached in the ordinary course of disposition on the merit until after the expiration of a long period of time. The statute authorizes the imposition by this Court of a penalty not exceeding ten per cent (10%) to be adjudged against the plaintiff in error in favor of the' defendant in error in'eases where it is the judgment of the Court that the writ of error was prosecuted solely for the purpose of delay, but the statute does not require the Court to impose the penalty and, therefore, we shall refrain from imposing' the penalty of assessing damages against the plaintiff in error in this case. For the reasons stated, the writ of error should be quashed and it is so ordered. Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Strum, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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Williams v. Dunn, 105 Fla. 327 (Fla. 1932)…good faith or merely for delay. Holland v. Webster, 43 Fla. 85, 29 So. 625. A motion to dismiss that is appropriately framed may be treated as a motion to quash under the statute. Ruff v. G. L. Co., 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 383; 98 Fla. 559, 124 So. 21; 99 Fla. 368, 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126. In this ease the motion to dismiss will be regarded as a motion to quash and due consideration leads to the conclusion that the motion should be granted. Chancery Rules provide: “Rule 85. After the cause is at issue and…
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Lane v. State, 154 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1944)…so easily sacrificed to shadow and pretense.” To like effect was the holding in Ruff, et al., v. Guaranty Title & Trust Co., et al., 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 283, and in Holland v. Webster, 43 Fla. 85, 29 So. 625; Crump v. Snively-Giddings Const. Co., 99 Fla. 368, 126 So. 291; Randall v. Twitchell, 98 Fla. 559, 124 So. 21, followed in Langfield v. Cozine, 98 Fla. 564, 124 So. 23, 98 Fla. 565, 124 So. 23; Anderson v. Hardesty, 99 Fla. 1347, 128 So. 851; Walker v. American Agr. Chemical Co., 83 Fla. 153, 90 So…