TREASURE COAST MOTOR SALES, INC. D/B/A TOYOTA OF STUART, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES L. HEATON, APPELLEE
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Treasure Coast Motor Sales appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of a dispute with Heaton over the sale and non-delivery of a vehicle. The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause in the parties' motor vehicle purchase agreement clearly applied to the entire contract and thus required arbitration of Heaton's claims for specific performance and deceptive trade practices.
The arbitration provision applies to the contract as a whole and encompasses Heaton's claims. The clause's location in the contract does not indicate that it applies only to a specific provision; rather, it is clearly separate and distinct from other contract sections, and nothing in the wording of the arbitration or rescission provisions supports a more restrictive interpretation.
[1] A motor vehicle purchase agreement's arbitration clause requiring arbitration for any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the contract or its breach applie…
[2] The location of an arbitration clause within a contract does not limit its scope to specific sections unless the wording of the clause or other provisions clearly implies…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE BREACH THEREOF, SHALL BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION IN SOUTHEAST FLORIDA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND JUDGMENT UPON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATION MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF.”
The arbitration clause from the parties' motor vehicle purchase agreement, which the court found applied to the entire contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHeaton purchased a Land Cruiser from Treasure Coast Motor Sales pursuant to a written contract that included an arbitration clause. After paying for t…
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STONE, J.
We reverse an order denying Treasure Coast’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitration is required by the terms of the parties’ motor vehicle purchase agreement.
Heaton paid Treasure Coast for a Land Cruiser in accordance with the terms of the contract, but Treasure Coast refused to deliver the vehicle. Heaton sued for specific performance and deceptive and unfair trade practices and Treasure Coast moved to compel arbitration.
The contract contained the following arbitration clause:
ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE BREACH THEREOF, SHALL BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION IN SOUTHEAST FLORIDA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND JUDGMENT UPON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATION MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF. Heaton’s claim is within the scope of this provision.
Heaton’s sole argument against arbitration is based on the location of the arbitration clause in the contract. He asserts that its location indicates that arbitration is applicable only to a specific clause and that the subject clause is not germane to this transaction. The trial court was persuaded by this argument.
We conclude' upon de novo review of the document that the arbitration provision applies to the contract as a whole. See Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v. LVWD, Ltd., 766 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We note that in the left column of the contract there are several headings. Those headings are, from top to bottom: “trade-in information,” “payoff information,” “estimated payoff acknowledgment,” “rescission agreement,” and “insurance information,” under which Heaton’s insurance company and policy number are printed. The arbitration provision follows the “insurance information” section, and is clearly separate and distinct from the “rescission agreement” section, the clause to which Heaton claims it is limited. Nothing in the wording of either the arbitration or rescission provision implies the more restrictive interpretation advocated by Heaton.
We reverse and remand accordingly.
WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ„ concur.
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Anthony James Dev., Inc. v. Balboa St. Beach Club, Inc., 875 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…agencies, the record does not indicate that Buyer or Seller had yet received such approval. The purpose of specific performance is to compel a party to do what it agreed to do pursuant to a contract. See Treasure Coast Motor Sales, Inc. v. Heaton, 848 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). By holding that Buyer must accept the property “as is,” without obtaining the approvals, the trial court went beyond the contract in ordering specific performance. Clearly, by the contract terms and absent a breach, Buyer…
Authorities Cited
- Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v. LVWD, Ltd., 766 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)