JAMES H. CARROW, APPELLANT,
v.
THE FLORIDA BAR, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
James Carrow appealed two nonfinal orders in his case against The Florida Bar: one imposing a stay of discovery pending a legally sufficient complaint, and another denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge. The appellate court dismissed the certiorari petition regarding the discovery stay and denied the prohibition petition regarding the disqualification motion, finding both orders proper under applicable law.
The discovery stay order is properly subject to certiorari review, but Carrow failed to establish material injury warranting relief because the stay was only temporary until a valid complaint was filed. The disqualification motion was legally insufficient under Rule 2.160 because it failed to specifically allege facts describing prejudice or bias of the judge, and therefore the denial of the motion was proper and prohibition will not issue.
[1] An order imposing a stay of discovery is reviewable by petition for writ of certiorari.
[2] To prevail on a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of an interlocutory order, a petitioner must demonstrate a departure from the essential requirements of law…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to prevail when seeking review of an interlocutory order by common law certiorari, the petitioner must establish that (1) the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law; (2) which has resulted in a material injury that will affect the remainder of the proceeding; and (3) which cannot be corrected through any other means.”
Establishes the three-part test for obtaining certiorari review of an interlocutory order.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarrow filed a case against The Florida Bar. The trial court imposed a stay of discovery until Carrow filed a legally sufficient complaint. The trial …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prejudice Of Judge cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
James Carrow appeals two nonfinal, nonappealable orders entered in the trial court proceedings. We treat Carrov/s appeal as both a petition for writ of certiorari and a petition for writ of prohibition, dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari, and deny the petition for writ of prohibition.
Carrow first appeals an order imposing a stay of discovery until such time as he files a legally sufficient complaint. An order on a motion imposing a stay of discovery is reviewable by petition for writ of certiorari. See Perry v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Accordingly, we treat this portion of the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari.
In order to prevail when seeking review of an interlocutory order by common law certiorari, the petitioner must establish that (1) the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law; (2) which has resulted in a material injury that will affect the remainder of the proceeding; and (3) which cannot be corrected through any other means. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995); Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987). Here, the stay is imposed only “until further order of the Court.” In addition, the trial court noted at the hearing that the purpose of imposing the stay was simply to prevent discovery until there was a valid, operable complaint. Accordingly, once there is a valid complaint in place, the stay will be lifted, and Carrow will be entitled to those items that are discoverable. Under these circumstances, Carrow has not established that he has suffered a material injury that will affect the remainder of the proceedings. Therefore, we dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari addressed to this order. Carrow also appeals the order denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge. An order denying a motion to disqualify a trial judge is reviewed by a petition for writ of prohibition. Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1978); Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Baker, 647 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Accordingly, we treat this portion of the appeal as a petition for "writ of prohibition.
A motion to disqualify a trial judge must comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160. Time Warner, 647 So. 2d at 1071. If the motion does not comply with the requirements of the rule, the writ will not issue. Id. Rule 2.160(c) requires a motion to disqualify a trial judge to be in writing, specifically allege the facts and reasons relied upon for disqualification, and be sworn to by the party signing the motion. In addition, rule 2.160(d) requires that the motion show that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial based on a specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge or that the judge is related to a party or other attorney in the case.
Here, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing that Carrow’s motion did not allege any facts or reasons to disqualify Judge Holder and did not include any facts “specifically describing” any prejudice or bias of Judge Holder. Rather, Carrow’s motion was a blanket motion asking any trial judge assigned to the ease to recuse himself or herself if he or she could not be fair. This motion is legally insufficient pursuant to rule 2.160 and impermissibly shifts the burden of identifying prejudice or bias from the litigant onto the trial court. Therefore, we deny the writ of prohibition.
Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed; petition for writ of prohibition denied.
WHATLEY, NORTHCUTT, and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2008)…ial. Id. Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 41. A petition for writ of prohibition is the proper means through which to challenge a lower court’s denial of a motion to disqualify. See Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.1978); see also Carrow v. Fla. Bar, 848 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Lynch contends that the conduct of the postconviction court after the conclusion of the rule 3.851 hearing and the court’s analysis and commentary in its second amended order denying postconviction relief and rehearing ren…
-
Carrion v. State, 859 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…greater moment where, as here, the trial court has previously determined that a competency examination is appropriate. As we find that all requisites to the granting of a petition for writ of certiorari are satisfied, see Carrow v. The Florida Bar, 848 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 858 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Oct. 1, 2003), we grant the petition and stay the trial of this case contingent upon the holding of a competency hearing. PETITION GRANTED. THOMPSON and TORPY, JJ„ concur.…
-
Gibellina v. Iwanowski, 103 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…llina appeals a nonfinal order that denied relief from past orders and denied his motion to disqualify the trial judge. We treat Gibellina’s argument about the motion to disqualify as a petition seeking a writ of prohibition, see Carrow v. Fla. Bar, 848 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and we deny the petition. We also affirm on the remaining issues raised on appeal. We are not unsympathetic to Gibellina’s argument that he should have some opportunity for timesharing with his minor child. But the circui…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995)
- THE Florida BAR v. Sanford Freed, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978)
- Robbyn Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Perry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. & David Ussery, 379 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P. v. Hon. Joseph P. Baker, 647 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)