WILLIAM DAVID DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that an order entered by a judge who has recused himself from a case is void and has no effect.
[1] An order entered by a judge who has recused himself from a case is void and has no legal effect.
[2] A trial court's ruling on a motion for rehearing made by a judge who had previously recused himself from the case is a fatal procedural error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant filed a motion for rehearing, which was ruled on by a judge who had previously recused himself from the case. The trial court denied the mot…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, William Davis, appeals the denial of his rule 3.850 motion, which was based on alleged newly discovered evidence that defense counsel had failed to relay a plea offer to him. We reverse and remand the case due to a fatal procedural error on the rehearing motion; for this reason, we do not reach the merits of the appeal.
The motion was originally assigned to Judge Frederic Buttner, but Judge Buttner recused himself from the case by order of February 5, 2002. The motion was then assigned to Judge William Wilkes. Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Wilkes denied the motion on July 26, 2002. On August 12, 2002, Davis filed a motion for rehearing. The motion was apparently assigned to Judge Buttner, although he had previously recused himself from Davis’ case. Judge Buttner entered an order denying rehearing on August 13, 2002. Davis argues on appeal that it was reversible error for a recused judge to rule on his motion for rehearing. We agree and reverse.
Once a trial judge recuses himself from a given case, any subsequent orders he enters in that case are void and have no effect. See Haverty v. State, 830 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Meaweather v. State, 732 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Weiss v. Miami Nat’l Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In the instant case, Judge Buttner recused himself on February 5, 2002. He lacked authority to make any further rulings on the case after that date. The order denying Davis’ motion for rehearing some six months later is therefore a nullity. Thus, we are constrained to reverse, to assure that due process is afforded to Davis. The case is remanded with directions that the chief judge of the circuit appoint a different judge to consider and rule on Davis’ motion for rehearing. See Thomas, supra, at 217; Meaweather, supra, at 500; Haverty, supra, at 264; Stokes v. State, 756 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Reversed and Remanded.
WEBSTER, PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Campos v. Joana Campos, 230 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…y, the successor judge’s July 20, 2016 order denying reunification without prejudice, and the December 22, 2016 order denying the motion to vacate. Appellate Jurisdiction It is true that orders entered by a re-cused judge are void. Davis v. State, 849 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). But that is not the issue. The issue is whether the order denying the former husband’s motion to vacate is appealable, and thus whether we have jurisdiction. The former husband relies on the timesharing provision of the n…
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Goolsby v. State, 914 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…1993). As a result, any order entered simultaneously with the order of recusal, as well as any subsequent orders she enters in that case, are void and have no effect. Jenkins v. Motorola, Inc., 911 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see Davis v. State, 849 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Haverty v. State, 830 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In denying Goolsby a new hearing on his rule 3.850 motion, Judge Waller concluded that she had not recused herself…
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Lance Block, P.A. v. Searcy, 85 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…udge ordered arbitration, he entered an order of recusal ex mero motu. The basic rule is clear: “Once a trial judge [*1124] recuses himself from a given case, any subsequent orders he enters in that case are void and have no effect.” Davis v. State, 849 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). See also Goolsby v. State, 914 So. 2d 494, 496-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“Any order entered by a recused judge is void. A void order has no force or effect and is a nullity.” (citations omitted)).2 Outside the parties’ prese…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Meaweather v. State, 732 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Weiss v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Mervin Armbrister v. State, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Haverty v. State, 830 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Theron Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Hastings v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Stokes v. State, 756 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Rooney v. State, 756 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)