PETER D. BARNA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANGELA C. BARNA, APPELLEE
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Peter Barna appealed a family court order denying his motion challenging the constitutionality of Florida's permanent alimony statutes and awarding attorney's fees to his ex-wife. The Fourth District affirmed the denial of his motion and the fee award, finding his constitutional challenge to the alimony statutes was frivolous and brought primarily to advance an unrelated organization's interests.
The court affirmed the denial of Barna's motion and the award of attorney's fees. The trial court properly awarded fees under section 57.105 because Barna's constitutional challenge was frivolous—it was not supported by material facts or applicable law and was brought primarily to advance an unrelated organization's agenda rather than his legitimate interests in the dissolution proceeding.
[1] A trial court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, when the losing party's claim or defense is not supported by mater…
[2] A party's constitutional challenge to alimony statutes may be deemed frivolous and warrant an award of attorney's fees if it is irrelevant and brought solely to advance t…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court found that appellant's counsel's attack on the alimony statutes was irrelevant, frivolous, and brought only to advance the cause of an unrelated client, the Alliance for Freedom from Alimony, Inc.”
Establishes the basis for the trial court's finding that the litigation was frivolous and not brought in good faith to advance Barna's interests in the dissolution proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePeter Barna's marriage was dissolved by final judgment on January 31, 2001, requiring him to pay child support and permanent alimony. He then filed a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHAHOOD, J.
Appellant’s, Peter Barna, marriage was dissolved by final judgment entered on January 31, 2001. Pursuant to the final judgment, appellant was to pay child support and permanent alimony. Thereafter, he filed a “Motion for a Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Injunctive Relief, Permanent Injunctive Relief, Recusal and Certiorari Because the Postdissolution Permanent Spousal Support Provisions of Florida Statutes Chapter 61 Violate the Florida Constitution.” Following a hearing, the court entered an order denying appellant’s motion and reserving jurisdiction to hear the former wife’s pending motion for attorney’s fees and costs. The court later granted the former wife’s motion for fees. That order is the subject of this appeal.
Appellant raises several issues on appeal. We affirm on all issues and write only to address the court’s award of fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes.
In the context of dissolution proceedings, appellant asserted his constitutional challenge to the alimony statutes. While appellant represented to the court that his actions did not require the former wife’s participation, the trial court found otherwise. In addition, the trial court found that appellant’s counsel’s attack on the alimony statutes was irrelevant, frivolous, and brought only to advance the cause of an unrelated client, the Alliance for Freedom from Alimony, Inc. As a result, the court awarded fees to the former wife for pursuing frivolous litigation brought without regard for the cost burden to the former wife.
Under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, the court may award fees to the prevailing party if at the time a claim or defense is presented to the court, the losing party knows or should know that it “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense” or “[wjould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” § 57.105(l)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (2002); see also Read v. Taylor, 832 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Based on the facts in this case, the trial court properly awarded fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Morrone v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 664 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(sua sponte awarding appellate fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes); see also Smyth v. Smyth, 417 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(sua sponte awarding appellate fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes).
AFFIRMED.
KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Read v. Taylor, 832 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Morrone v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 664 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Smyth v. Smyth, 417 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Martin Cnty. v. McROBERTS, 417 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)