SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
CHERYL D. CORDLE, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's award of attorney fees, finding that a "contingent risk" multiplier was improperly applied. The court clarified that a client's indigence does not make a fee arrangement contingent for the purpose of applying such multipliers.
Yes, the "contingent risk" multiplier was improperly applied. The court held that a client's indigence does not render a fee agreement contingent for the purpose of applying such multipliers.
[1] A "contingent risk" multiplier in attorney fee awards is inappropriate when the fee agreement is not contingent within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[2] The likelihood that a client will not pay an agreed-upon hourly fee does not, in itself, establish a "contingent" fee arrangement for the purpose of applying a multiplier…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Specifically, it argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying a “contingent risk” multiplier to more than double the “lodestar” amount which had been calculated based upon a reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly fee.”
States the appellant's main argument on appeal regarding the attorney fee award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe insured's attorney was awarded attorney fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes. The trial court applied a "contingent risk" multiplier to th…
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BARFIELD, J.
Appellant challenges the amount of attorney fees awarded to its insured pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes. Specifically, it argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying a “contingent risk” multiplier to more than double the “lodestar” amount which had been calculated based upon a reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly fee. The parties agree that there is no dispute in this appeal regarding the factual findings of the trial court’s order, and that the court’s legal rulings are therefore reviewed de novo, citing Menendez v. The Palms West Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We agree with appellant that use of a “contingent risk” multiplier was inappropriate in the circumstances.
The trial court found in its order that the attorney’s representation of the insured “was not contingent within the meaning of Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.5” and that “the contractual arrangement” between the insured and her attorney, in which the attorney “would have technically been entitled to recover his fee up to $200.00 per hour from the client, win or lose,” but agreed to accept “a reasonable fee awarded by the Court” pursuant to section 627.428, “is not considered a contingent fee arrangement as contemplat ed by Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Rule 4-1.5.” The trial court apparently based its decision to use the “contingent risk” multiplier on its finding that the fee in either case would be contingent on the attorney winning the case, because of the insured’s “indigent financial condition.” However, the likelihood that the client will not pay the agreed-upon hourly fee is not the criterium upon which “contingency” in this context is based.
Because we find that, based on the facts as found by the trial court, the fee agreement was not “contingent” within the meaning of Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990), the order is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for entry of an attorney fee award that does not use a “contingent risk” multiplier. WOLF and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Holiday v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 864 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…e. It appears to us that both agreements satisfy Kaufman. First, Kaufman does not dictate that any particular language or “magic words” be used in the agreement, provided the fee arrangement is, in fact, contingent. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Gordle, 851 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Secondly, the question certified to the Supreme Court in that case was couched broadly in terms of a “fee upon recovery.” Here, both the Holiday and Shealey fee agreements are contingent arrangements and are specifically conditi…
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Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 232 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…fees for the declaratory action,” we previously rejected a similar argument in the context of whether an inability to pay one’s contracted attorney’s fees transformed a fee agreement into a contingent fee agreement. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Cordle, 851 So. 2d 207, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (agreeing with the appellant that the trial court erred in applying a “ ‘contingent risk’ ” multiplier where the insured’s attorney “ ‘would have technically been entitled to recover his fee up to $200.00 per hour from the c…
Authorities Cited
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- Menendez v. The Palms W. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)