LEON STOKES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that claims for jail credit for time spent after sentencing must be pursued through administrative proceedings with the Department of Corrections, not a motion for jail credit filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a).
The defendant was arrested, posted bond, pleaded guilty to drug offenses, and was sentenced. He later filed a motion for jail credit, claiming entitle…
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
Leon Stokes challenges the summary denial of his motion for jail credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.
Stokes was arrested on April 21, 2000, and posted bond on April 25, 2000. On February 19, 2001, he pleaded guilty to two drug offenses and was sentenced to fifty-seven months in prison on each count to run concurrently. On January 11, 2002, Stokes was resentenced to 43.05 months in prison on each count to run concurrently.
In his motion, Stokes claims that he is entitled to 116 days’ jail credit for time he spent in the county jail. The record reflects that he was in the county jail from April 21, 2000, until April 25, 2000, and on February 19, 2001. This is a total of six days. The record reflects that he received the six days’ credit to which he is entitled.
Stokes also makes several claims for jail credit for days after his sentencing date of February 19, 2001. The relief he seeks regarding jail time spent after sentencing must be sought through administrative proceedings with the Department of Corrections. See Monroe v. State, 842 So. 2d 265, 265 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Knight v. State, 681 So. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying Stokes’ motion.
Affirmed.
FULMER and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Thomas v. State, 863 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…, because this time was included in the thirty-five days of jail credit she has already received. Thomas also is not entitled to credit for the time she spent in the Hillsborough County jail after her sentencing on May 31, 2002. See Stokes v. State, 851 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Tomlinson v. State, 477 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). In denying her claim for the time spent in the Pinellas County jail, the trial court asserted that Hillsborough County had placed Thomas on a detainer while she was in the Pi…
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Hardison v. State, 271 So. 3d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…ounty jail after sentencing.” Kitchen v. State, 20 So. 3d 975, 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Relief sought for “jail time spent after sentencing must be sought through administrative proceedings with the Department of Corrections.” Stokes v. State, 851 So. 2d 788, 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Thus, as the state argues, the trial court was not required to award the defendant jail credit for time served post- sentencing, so that the defendant is entitled to 1,103 days of jail credit for time served in the 2011 c…
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Landis v. State, 145 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Stovall v. Cooper, 860 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (en banc); Stokes v. State, 851 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 793 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). KELLY, VILLANTI, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Knight v. State, 681 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Monroe v. State, 842 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)