JOHN SEBRING BLACKWELDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Blackwelder appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The court reversed, holding that once an officer determined the temporary tag was valid, further detention violated the Fourth Amendment and required suppression of all evidence.
Once an officer has determined that the tag is valid and the initial reason for the stop is satisfied, the officer may no longer detain the driver. Any continued detention infringes Fourth Amendment rights, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.
[1] A police officer may not continue to detain a motorist after the purpose for the initial stop has been satisfied.
[2] Continued detention of a motorist after the purpose of the initial stop has been satisfied infringes upon Fourth Amendment rights.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once a police officer has totally satisfied the purpose for which he has initially stopped and detained the motorist, the officer no longer has any reasonable grounds or legal basis for continuing the detention of the motorist.”
The controlling standard from State v. Diaz establishing when detention must end
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Smith stopped Blackwelder's vehicle at 1:00 a.m. because he could not see a tag. As he approached from behind, he observed a valid temporary t…
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COVINGTON, Judge.
John Sebring Blackwelder appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Because the trial court erred in denying the motion, we reverse and remand for discharge.
Officer Henry Smith of the Frostproof Police Department stopped Blackwelder’s vehicle at 1:00 a.m. because Officer Smith could not see a tag on the vehicle. As Officer Smith approached the vehicle from behind, he saw a temporary tag displayed in the rear windshield. After seeing the tag, he made contact with Blackwelder, who said that he had lost his wallet. Blackwelder initially gave an incorrect name to the officer. Later, Blackwelder gave his correct name, and Officer Smith discovered that Blackwelder’s driver’s license had expired. Officer Smith arrested Blackwelder who ultimately was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, giving false identification to law enforcement, driving without a license, and possession of methamphetamine.
Blackwelder filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. Blackwelder then entered a plea to all five charges and reserved the right to appeal the denial of the dispositive motion to suppress.
This case is controlled by State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003), in which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed this court’s opinion in Diaz v. State, 800 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The facts of Diaz are similar to the facts of the instant case. In Diaz, an officer stopped a vehicle because the officer could not read a portion of a temporary tag. 850 So. 2d at 480. As the officer approached the vehicle, the officer determined the tag was valid, but the officer continued the stop and obtained information that led to the arrest of Diaz for felony driving with a suspended license. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court held that upon determining that the tag was valid, the officer could no longer detain the driver. Id. at 480. The court stated that “once a police officer has totally satisfied the purpose for which he has initially stopped and detained the motorist, the officer no longer has any reasonable grounds or legal basis for continuing the detention of the motorist.” Id. at 480. Any continued detention constitutes an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The only allowable personal contact an officer could make with the driver would be to explain the reason for the initial stop. Id. at 480.
Likewise in the instant case, once the officer approached Blackwelder’s vehicle and determined that Blackwelder was displaying a valid tag, he could no longer detain Blackwelder. Because the officer continued to detain Blackwelder, the trial court should have granted Blackwelder’s motion to suppress. Since the motion was dispositive, we reverse and remand for discharge on all five counts.
Reversed and remanded for discharge.
SALCINES and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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Cited By
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Lanier v. State, 936 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…senger’s arrest. We do agree with La-nier that an officer may not continue to detain a driver following a traffic stop once the purpose for the stop has been satisfied and removed. State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435, 437 (Fla.2003); Blackwelder v. State, 853 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Klein, 736 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, when a vehicle has been lawfully stopped and the investigation relating to the stop has not yet been completed, it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an offic…
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State v. Rivers, 861 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ccurred or was occurring.” Id. at 437. The only allowable personal contact an officer could make with the driver after determining that the tag was valid would be to explain the reason for the initial stop. Id. at 440. See also Blackwelder v. State, 853 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). This case is distinguishable from Diaz because, here, the officer did not continue the traffic stop on the basis of the temporary tag, but on his independent knowledge of the outstanding warrant. His initial contact with Rivers…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003)
- Diaz v. State, 800 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)