ROBIN ENGRAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that increasing a defendant's sentence after it has begun violates double jeopardy principles, and the trial court erred in imposing a harsher sentence.
Engram was initially sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). Three days later, the trial court resentenced him, adding a habitual offender (H…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prison Releasee Reoffender (Prr) Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PLEUS, J.
Engrain appeals his judgment and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for mistrial after the jury heard two references to collateral crimes and one comment on his right to remain silent. He also argues that the trial court erred by increasing his sentence after he had begun serving it. We affirm the judgment without discussion but vacate the sentence and remand with directions to impose the original sentence.
At the sentencing hearing on November 12, 2002, the state requested that Engram be sentenced both as a habitual offender (HO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), but the trial judge did not think both classifications were proper for a single offense. Consequently, the judge designated Engram a PRR and sentenced him to five years in prison.
Three days later, on November 15, 2002, Engram was brought back to court, where the trial judge stated that both designations should have been imposed. He also noted that under the current ease law, it was necessary to make the habitual offender sentence longer than the PRR sentence. Thus, he vacated the original sentence, imposed a new sentence of five years and one month and designated Engram a PRR and an HO.
Engram correctly argues that imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant has already begun serving his original sentence violates double jeopardy principles. Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000). The state concedes this point. The trial judge was under the mistaken impression that he was required to impose the HO sentence when, in fact, it was discretionary. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for imposition of the original sentence.
SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.
SAWAYA, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Duncan v. State, 901 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…reby waiving its right to seek alternative sentencing. Additionally, since the defendant had already begun to serve the sentence which was legally imposed upon him in October 2003, the trial court could not legally increase it. See Engram v. State, 853 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)(holding that the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant has already begun serving his original sentence violates double jeopardy principles). Accordingly, the trial court erred in awarding the State its request for ru…
-
Greenwich v. State, 51 So. 3d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…udgment should be corrected accordingly. Second, the court erred when it resentenced Greenwich to a greater term, as he had begun serving his sentence and the imposition of a harsher sentence violates double jeopardy principles. See Engram v. State, 853 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). For these reasons, on remand, the trial court shall correct its judgment to reflect that Greenwich received time served for the trespass and assault convictions and reimpose the sentences orally pronounced for the remaini…
-
Thaddeus Chaylon Martin v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…serving his 2013 sentence, constitute a violation of double jeopardy? Martin answers each of these questions affirmatively, relying on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1) (30-day limitation for appeal of a sentence) and Engram v. State, 853 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (modification increasing sentence after a defendant has already begun serving the original sentence violates double jeopardy). We answer each of these questions in the negative. Regarding the error in the preparation of t…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)