MARCIA M. BLANCO, APPELLANT,
v.
GUILLERMO I. NOVOA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Blanco appeals a trial court order requiring her to post accrued rent into the court registry as a condition of contesting an eviction action. The appellate court reverses, holding that the agreement between Blanco and Novoa was a secured purchase contract, not a simple landlord-tenant lease, and therefore the statutory rent-deposit requirement does not apply.
The trial court erred in applying landlord-tenant law and the rent-deposit requirement because the agreement between Blanco and Novoa was not a simple lease but rather a secured purchase contract. The substance of the transaction, not its form, controls; the parties intended a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, not a landlord-tenant relationship. Consequently, Novoa's proper remedy is foreclosure, not eviction with a rent-deposit requirement.
[1] A trial court errs by requiring a party to deposit rent into the court registry when the parties' relationship is not solely that of landlord and tenant, but involves sha…
[2] The substance of a transaction, rather than its form or the labels used by the parties, determines whether an instrument should be deemed a mortgage or a lease.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court erred by requiring Blanco to deposit payments into the court registry because Novoa and Blanco were not simply landlord and tenant, respectively, they shared an equal interest in the property.”
Establishes the court's core holding that the relationship between the parties was not a true landlord-tenant relationship and therefore the statutory rent-deposit requirement did not apply.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlanco and her uncle Novoa took joint title to a condominium in 2000, with Novoa providing all purchase funds. They executed an agreement styled as a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Contract For Sale Of Real Property cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Marcia M. Blanco appeals from a non-final order granting appellee Guillermo I. Novoa’s motion to require Blanco to post accrued rent into the registry of the court. We reverse.
Blanco is Novoa’s niece.
On August 31, 2000, they took joint title to a condominium located in Hialeah, Florida. Novoa purchased the property with his own funds.
On September 15, 2000, Blanco and Novoa entered into an agreement whereby Blanco would take possession of the property and pay $740 per month to Novoa, as well as all condominium assessments and property taxes. The parties used a standard landlord-tenant lease form in which the monthly payments to Novoa were called “rent”, Blanco was called the “lessee” and Novoa the “lessor.” However, the agreement also contained a clause that obligated Novoa to sell the property and Blanco to purchase the property for $89,831.56 in five years. Blanco was in possession of the condominium and made payments from November 1, 2000 until October 1, 2002.
On July 2, 2002, a Quit Claim Deed was recorded which purportedly gave Blanco’s half interest in the condominium to Novoa. Blanco claims not to have signed the document. Blanco has not made any of the payments required by the agreement since November 1, 2002.
On December 19, 2002, Blanco filed a complaint seeking to cancel the Quit Claim Deed, monetary damages for fraud in the execution of a Quit Claim Deed to real property, and specific performance of the contract for sale of the unit. Novoa counterclaimed for breach of contract and eviction in March, 2003. Novoa then filed a motion to require Blanco to post rent with the registry of the court or be defaulted on the counterclaim for eviction.
The trial court granted the motion and ordered Blanco to deposit $5,180.00 into the court registry within fifteen days of the order or waive any defenses to the eviction. The deadline was twice extended to accommodate this appeal.
The trial court construed the agreement between Blanco and Novoa to be a lease and consequently applied the law governing landlords and tenants. For a tenant to contest an eviction action, any defense other than payment requires the tenant to deposit accrued rent and any rent which accrues during the pendency of the proceeding into the court registry. See § 88.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2003).
The trial court erred by requiring Blanco to deposit payments into the court registry because Novoa and Blanco were not simply landlord and tenant, respectively, they shared an equal interest in the property. The agreement provided for monthly payments equal to ten percent interest with the payment of fees and taxes consistent with those a mortgagor would make. Blanco would buy out Novoa’s interest in the condominium at the end of five years with a final balloon payment.
The Quit Claim Deed, if genuine, would make them landlord and tenant. However, if it is a forgery, the two are joint tenants. To impose the obligation to pay rent into the registry of the court is to decide the validity of the Quit Claim Deed and provide the remedy before the case is properly adjudicated in court.
Under section 697.01, Florida Statutes (2003), “[a]ll conveyances, obligations conditioned or defeasible, bills of sale or other instruments of writing conveying or selling property ... for the purpose or with the intention of securing the payment of money ... shall be deemed and held mortgages .... ” In deciding whether a conveyance should be declared a mortgage under the statute “depends on the particular facts, and as the statute provides, is a question of the parties’ intent.” Valk v. J.E.M. Distrib., 700 So. 2d 416, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). “[EJquity will look at and take into consideration all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and will decree an instrument to be a deed or mortgage according to the real intentions of the parties.” Id. (alteration in original).
The substance and not the form is what is critical. Here, the trial court erred by determining that the words “lease” and “rent” controlled when the parties clearly acted not as landlord and tenant, but rather as mortgagor and mortgagee.
Thus, the remedy available to Novoa in this case is that of a foreclosure proceeding.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Oregrund Ltd. P'ship v. Sheive, 873 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…in usury, and for the related relief of quiet title11 and civil theft.12 We find nothing in the record to justify the dismissal of Count VII, which alternately pleaded for a declaration of the deed to be a mortgage, section 697.01, Blanco v. Novoa, 854 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), Smith v. Potter, 406 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); or for cancellation of the deed, Leonard v. Howarth, 153 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders and remand for further action consiste…
-
Dalia Minalla v. Equinamics Corp., 954 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…t the trial court erred in imposing such a requirement, erred in entering the default judgment, and reverse the entry of the final default judgment. Id. at 897-98; see also Grimm v. Huckabee, 891 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Cf. Blanco v. Novoa, 854 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(reversing a motion to pay accrued “rent” into the registry of the court where the trial court “construed the agreement between Blanco and Novoa to be a [true] lease” rather than a mortgage); First Hanover v. Vazquez, 848 So.…
-
Knowles v. Edwards, 967 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…e with a contract of repurchase, the court will look at the circumstances underlying the transaction. See Pineapple Orange Co. v. White, 113 Fla. 774, 152 So. 863, 864 (1934). A court also considers the parties’ real intentions. See Blanco v. Novoa, 854 So. 2d 672, 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); McLendon v. Davis, 131 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Here, there was no competent substantial evidence that the conveyance from Mintz to Knowles by a quitclaim deed was a loan. On the contrary, the only competent subs…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Inversiones Armadeni, S.A. v. Tejedo, 700 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Valk v. J.E.M. Distribs. OF Tampa BAY, Inc., 700 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)