MARIE ELENA LAFLAM, APPELLANT,
v.
KEVIN P. LAFLAM, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in imputing income to the wife without competent, substantial evidence, requiring a redetermination of alimony.
[1] A court may impute income to a spouse only when there is competent, substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the spouse could earn the imputed amount.
[2] A spouse's prior employment history alone is insufficient to impute income if there is no evidence that the spouse can presently earn the prior salary.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution action, the wife requested alimony, but the trial court denied it after imputing $4000/month income to her based on a past salary. Th…
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
In this dissolution of marriage action, the parties amicably resolved all issues except alimony. The circuit court denied Mrs. LaFlam’s request for permanent, rehabilitative, and bridge-the-gap alimony. We reverse for further proceedings because the court determined the alimony issue after improperly imputing income to Mrs. LaFlam.
The LaFlams were married in December 1988. At that time, Mr. LaFlam was in the military and Mrs. LaFlam was working for an international banking organization in Washington, D.C. Shortly before the wedding, he was seriously injured in a car accident and became a quadriplegic. In May 1989, Mrs. LaFlam left her employment to provide her husband with full-time nursing care. She obtained training at a hospital so that she could supply the level of care Mr. LaFlam needed. Mrs. LaFlam continued to provide this care until mid-1996, when the Veteran’s Administration began giving Mr. LaFlam skilled nursing care at no charge.
Neither of the LaFlams held any significant employment during their marriage. They lived on Mr. LaFlam’s Veteran’s Administration and Social Security benefits, which, at the time of the final hearing, were about $7000 per month. Mr. LaFlam attended college and obtained a bachelor’s degree. After the Veteran’s Administration began providing a skilled nurse for Mr. LaFlam, Mrs. LaFlam returned to college and earned a master’s degree in linguistics. She testified that she did so because she enjoyed that field of study. She never intended to support herself with her degree because the couple’s needs were met by Mr. LaFlam’s benefits.
In its detailed order denying alimony, the circuit court addressed the factors enumerated in section 61.08(2)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes (2000). When rejecting Mrs. LaFlam’s request for alimony, the court imputed $4000 per month income to her. The court apparently based the amount on her 1988 salary at the international banking concern in Washington, D.C. At that time, she earned $3600 per month. Her income was not taxed because she was a Peruvian citizen.
A court may impute income to a spouse who is earning less than she could with the use of her best efforts. Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). However, there must be competent, substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the spouse could earn the imputed amount. See Hinton v. Smith, 725 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (explaining that the standard of review of a court’s decision to impute income is whether competent, substantial evidence supports its conclusion).
Nothing in this record established that Mrs. LaFlam, now aged forty-five, was capable of earning the salary she gave up some thirteen years earlier in order to care for her husband. In fact, there was no record evidence whatsoever about the nature of her position in Washington, what skills were required, whether these skills were current, whether they could presently be applied in any other position, or what that position might pay. Moreover, Mrs. LaFlam testified that she had sought a position with her former employer, but that none was available. She also testified that there were no similar jobs in Florida.
The only testimony about Mrs. LaF-lam’s present earning ability came from Mrs. LaFlam herself. She testified that her master’s degree in linguistics would not enable her to earn sufficient money to pay her expenses. If there were teaching opportunities open at the University of South Florida, she could teach three classes per semester at the rate of $2000 per class. She applied to teach at Hills-borough Community College, where she could earn $1590 per quarter, but was not hired. The year before the hearing, while Mrs. LaFlam was pursuing her master’s degree, USF paid her a total of approximately $2000 as a stipend.
We reverse the final judgment because the imputation of $4000 per month income to Mrs. LaFlam was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Hinton, 725 So. 2d at 1156. On remand, the circuit court must redetermine whether she is entitled to any form of alimony. See Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Gregoire v. Gregoire, 615 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Geddes v. Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The court may take additional evidence, if needed.
Reversed.
STRINGER and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Andrews v. Andrews, 867 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…she would ever be rehired by Bell-South. As noted above, there must be substantial competent evidence in the record to support the level of income imputed to a spouse. See Gerthe v. Gerthe, 857 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); LaFlam v. LaFlam, 854 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In this case, the only evidence regarding Rebecca’s income was her prior salary of $75,466 earned in 2000, and a past earnings history record averaging $50,000 per year, before 1996 when the parties resided in Alabama. Rebecca’s…
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Brown v. Cannady-Brown, 954 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…[*1209] petent, substantial evidence, the court found: [T]here must be substantial competent evidence in the record to support the level of income imputed to a spouse. See Gerthe v. Gerthe, 857 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); LaFlam v. LaFlam, 854 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In this case, the only evidence regarding [the former wife’s] income was her prior salary of $75,466 earned in 2000, and a past earnings history record averaging $50,000 per year, before 1996 when the parties resided in Alabama.…
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McCANTS v. McCANTS, 984 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…nthly income to be $1298. The Wife contends, and we agree, that the trial court did not have competent, substantial evidence to support its finding concerning imputed income. See Gruber v. Gruber, 857 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); LaFlam v. LaFlam, 854 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Gruber involved an alimony modification proceeding. The former husband’s income consisted of only disability benefits, and a [*681] doctor testified that the former husband “was unable to do any kind of work, even sedentary work…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Lucinda Jean Hinton v. Smith, 725 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Gregoire v. Gregoire, 615 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Ogden Aviation Servs. & Alexsis, Inc. v. Khalid DAR, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Heights, Inc. v. Mustafa Atac, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Brown v. State, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Geddes v. Gudrun Margrit Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)