ELVIS T. FRANCES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 16-year-old defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a confession, arguing his statements were involuntary because he was not given an opportunity to speak with his mother before police questioning. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that there is no constitutional requirement to notify a juvenile's parents prior to questioning, and the defendant's confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. There is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile's parents prior to questioning, and there is no affirmative obligation to extend an opportunity to speak with parents unless the juvenile requests it. The defendant's confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances.
[1] A juvenile's confession is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, it was not coerced.
[2] There is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile's parents prior to questioning the juvenile.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile's parents prior to questioning the juvenile.”
Establishes the primary legal principle that there is no constitutional mandate for parental notification before juvenile interrogation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant, age 16, was questioned by police and gave a confession. He was Mirandized twice before questioning and was fully aware of why he was be…
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PLEUS, J.
The defendant’s sole point on appeal concerns the denial of his motion to suppress his confession. The defendant, age 16 at the time he confessed, urged suppression claiming his statements during police questioning were involuntary because he was not afforded an opportunity to talk with his mother prior to the questioning. We affirm.
The trial court found and the record contains competent substantial evidence that (1) the defendant was Miran-dized twice before being questioned, (2) he was fully aware of why he was being questioned, (3) he indicated he understood his rights and never asked for an attorney, (4) he was a good student, (5) he had been in legal trouble before at which time he had been read his Miranda rights, and (6) he was informed that his mother had been contacted whereupon he told the officers that he did not get along with his mother. At no time did he ask for an opportunity to speak with her. There is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile’s parents prior to questioning the juvenile.1 See Brancaccio v. State, 773 So. 2d 582, 583-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022, 122 S.Ct. 549, 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001). Likewise, there appears to be no affirmative obligation on the part of the police to extend an opportunity to a juvenile to speak with his parents prior to questioning where the juvenile does not request such opportunity. What is clear, however, at least in the context of custodial interrogation, is that if a juvenile indicates to police that he or she does not wish to speak to them until he or she has had an opportunity to speak with parents, the questioning must cease. B.P. v. State, 815 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The defendant here did not make such a request.
The voluntariness of the defendant’s confession is determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. See Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1999). As stated in Brancaccio:
For a juvenile’s confession, the relevant circumstances include: (a) the manner in which the police administered Miranda rights, (b) the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, (c) whether the juvenile had an opportunity to speak with his/her parents before confessing, and (d) whether the juvenile executed a written waiver of the Miranda rights prior to making the confession.
773 So. 2d at 583-84.
Based on the totality of the evidence, there is no basis for concluding that the defendant’s confession was in any way coerced or involuntary. See, e.g., Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1999); Brancacdo. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. . Section 985.207(2), Florida Statutes, does require police to attempt to notify a juvenile's parents upon talcing the juvenile into custody, though the failure to do so does not per se render a confession involuntary. Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1999). In any event, the detectives here contacted the defendant’s mother prior to questioning her son.
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M.A.B. v. State, 957 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…ficers departed from a standard procedure. I recognize that there is no constitutional requirement that the police notify a juvenile’s parents prior to questioning. See J.G. v. State, 883 So. 2d 915, 924 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citing Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). However, the failure to do so is relevant to assessing the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver. § 985.207(2); J.G., 883 So. 2d at 924. The trial court concluded that M.A.B.’s signed waiver of rights form was adequate and…
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Davis v. State, 922 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…to speak to his mother. If, during a custodial interrogation, a juvenile “indicates to police that he or she does not wish to speak to them until he or she has had an opportunity to speak with parents, the questioning must cease.” Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The trial court was well aware of this rule of law but correctly found that it did not apply in this instance. Instead, the trial court found that “[Davis’] requests to speak with his mother after the interview, or before…
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J.G. a child v. State, 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…to the police station or his being subjected to an uncounselled police interview in the station house. Although “[tjhere is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile’s parents prior to questioning the juvenile,” Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), a Florida statute specifically addresses the notification requirement and states in relevant part: 985.207 Taking a child into custody.— * * * (2) When a child is taken into custody as provided in this section, the pers…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999)
- Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1999)
- Brancaccio v. State, 773 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- M.Q.C. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 815 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Knight v. Schmitz, 534 U.S. 1022 (U.S. 2001)
- Hagan v. United States, 534 U.S. 1022 (U.S. 2001)