CHRISTOPHER MANNING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Christopher Manning appealed his conviction for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, arguing the trial court gave the jury an incorrect statutory definition of burglary. The court reversed, finding that the trial court applied the pre-July 1, 2001 definition to conduct occurring after that date, and that this constituted fundamental error because the burglary elements were disputed facts at trial.
The trial court committed fundamental error by providing an inaccurate instruction as to the disputed elements of burglary. An incorrect instruction relating to a disputed element of a crime constitutes fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
[1] Giving the jury an inaccurate instruction as to a disputed element of a crime constitutes fundamental error.
[2] An incorrect jury instruction on the definition of burglary is fundamental error when the elements of that definition are disputed issues of fact.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the giving of an inaccurate instruction as to a disputed element of a crime is fundamental error”
Establishes the legal standard for fundamental error in jury instructions regarding crime elements
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceManning was charged with burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein for conduct occurring on November 18, 2001. The trial court instruc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Disputed Issues Of Material Fact cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his conviction for burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein, arguing that the trial court committed fundamental error by incorrectly instructing the jury as to the applicable statutory definition of burglary. Concluding that the trial court provided the jury an incorrect definition of burglary, and concluding further that the incorrect instruction related to disputed issues of fact, we reverse the appellant’s conviction.
Chapter 2001-58, Laws of Florida, amended section 810.02, Florida Statutes, to provide a new definition of burglary for offenses committed after July 1, 2001. Although the date of the appellant’s alleged offense was November 18, 2001, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the definition applicable to offenses committed on or before July 1, 2001. The appellant did not offer any objection to the incorrect instruction or otherwise preserve the argument he now makes on appeal. He nevertheless relies upon Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366 (Fla.2002), in arguing that the error was fundamental and may therefore be presented for the first time on appeal. Like State v.Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1991), Reed stands for the proposition that the giving of an inaccurate instruction as to a disputed element of a crime is fundamental error. Because the jury in the present case could not have determined whether the appellant’s acts amounted to burglary without resolving disputed issues of fact, the elements contained within the definition of burglary were disputed elements of the charged offense. The incorrect instruction as to these elements therefore amounted to fundamental error.*
The appellant’s conviction for burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein is accordingly reversed and this case is remanded.
ALLEN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur. *
The appellant argues that section 810.02(l)(b)2 applies only in a situation where there is a licensed or invited entry. Our decision in this case should not be interpreted as necessarily approving this reading of the statute, as opposed to a reading which would make section 810.02(l)(b)2 applicable regardless of whether a licensed or invited entry has occurred.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
R.J.R. v. State, 88 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…could only be convicted of one offense of resisting an officer, regardless of whether more than one officer was involved, because the defendant’s actions were a “continuous resistance to the ongoing attempt to effect his arrest.”); Andrew v. State, 861 So. 2d 528, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (vacating the defendant’s conviction and sentence for resisting arrest without violence as the charges of resisting with violence and without violence “may only be seen as continuous resistance to [an officer’s] ongoing atte…
Authorities Cited
- Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2002)
- D'Angelo v. State, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Batraville Vincent Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)