WILLIAM E. TEAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
William Teal appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, challenging whether he qualified for habitual felony offender sentencing due to allegedly deficient predicate convictions. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, holding that a community control sanction constitutes a 'sentence' under the habitual felony offender statute and can serve as a valid predicate conviction.
The court held that a community control sanction qualifies as a 'sentence' under the habitual felony offender statute, and therefore Teal's 1992 conviction with community control properly served as a predicate conviction for habitualization. The court rejected Teal's argument that only the subsequent 5.5-year prison sentence constituted his actual sentence.
[1] Placement on community control constitutes a "sanction" for purposes of habitual felony offender sentencing.
[2] A conviction followed by placement on community control can serve as a predicate conviction for habitualization.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[w]hen it enacted the habitual felony offender statute, the legislature intended that once a defendant had twice been convicted with sanctions the third conviction would be enhanced. We find that a sentence, as referred to in section 775.084, includes the sanction of probation.”
Establishes the legislative intent and broad interpretation of 'sentence' to include probation sanctions under the habitual felony offender statute
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1992, Teal was convicted of robbery and placed on two years of community control followed by two years of probation. After violating probation, he …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Predicate Convictions cases and more on FLexlaw
SILBERMAN, Judge.
William E. Teal challenges the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He argues that he did not qualify for a habitual felony offender sentence because he did not have the necessary predicate convictions. As explained below, we disagree and affirm the sentence. Regarding Teal’s claims that the judgment and sentence did not conform to the oral pronouncement and that the sentencing court erred in using a revised scoresheet, we affirm without discussion.
In 1992, in trial court case number 91-20507, Teal was adjudicated guilty of robbery and placed on two years of community control followed by two years of probation. He later pleaded guilty to a violation of probation and was sentenced to thirty months in prison. After he filed a petition for reconsideration of sentence, Teal’s sentence was vacated and he was again placed on two years of community control followed by two years of probation. He later violated his community control and was sentenced to 5.5 years of imprisonment.
In the present case, in January 1997 Teal was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to 22.5 years in prison consecutive to his sentence of 5.5 years in case number 91-20507. Teal subsequently filed a motion to correct illegal sentence alleging that he lacked the necessary predicate offenses for the habitual felony offender sentence. The State relied on Teal’s 1992 conviction in case number 91-20507, together with a 1991 conviction for kidnapping, as the two predicate convictions for habitualization.
In his motion, Teal claimed that it was improper to use the conviction in case number 91-20507 as a predicate conviction because the trial court originally placed him on community control. He contended that placement on community control was not a sentence; instead, he asserted that he received a sentence in case number 91-20507 only after the trial court found him guilty of violating his community control and imposed the sentence of 5.5 years in prison. Teal further argued that because the prison sentence in case number 91-20507 was imposed on the same day that he was convicted and habitualized in the present case, the conviction in case number 91-20507 was not a proper predicate for habitualization pursuant to section 775.084(5), Florida Statutes (2002). We disagree.
As this court stated in McCall v. State, No. 2D03-1225, 862 So. 2d 807, 2003 WL 22849397 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec.3, 2003), “[w]hen it enacted the habitual felony offender statute, the legislature intended that once a defendant had twice been convicted with sanctions the third conviction would be enhanced. We find that a sentence, as referred to in section 775.084, includes the sanction of probation.” We conclude that the same analysis applies to a sanction of community control, and therefore, Teal’s 1992 conviction and placement on community control in case number 91-20507 could properly serve as a predicate conviction for habitualization in the present case. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court and, as we did in McCall, certify conflict with Richardson v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1716, — So. 2d -, 2008 WL 21697171 (Fla. 4th DCA July 23, 2008).
Affirmed; conflict certified.
ALTENBERND, C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Love v. State, 886 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…the sanction of probation. The court found that when the legislature enacted the habitual offender statute, it intended that once a defendant was twice convicted with sanctions, the third convic [*278] tion would be enhanced. See also Teal v. State, 862 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). There are numerous cases which hold that probation is not a sentence. See, e.g., Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746 (Fla.2002) (probation is technically not a sentence); Waite v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 681 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 1…
-
Rivera v. State, 903 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Burrows v. State, 890 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Teal v. State, 862 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review granted, No. SC04-102, 898 So. 2d 81, 2005 WL 937725 (Fla. Apr. 1, 2005); McCall v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Robbins v. State, 816 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Cook v. State, 816 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA…
-
Prudent v. State, 898 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…as a qualifying offense for an enhanced penalty under the habitual offender statute. As Prudent recognizes, his position is contrary to this court’s recent decision in State v. Del Castillo, 890 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). See also Teal v. State, 862 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), appeal docketed, No. SC04-102 (Fla.2004); McCall v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), appeal docketed, No. SC04-136 (Fla.2004). We therefore affirm, and certify conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCALL v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)