BRUCE W. GLOVER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether the defendant's age (over 18) is an element of capital sexual battery. The court held that age is an element of the offense and approved the Fifth District's affirmance of Glover's conviction on harmless error grounds.
The defendant's age (over eighteen) is an element of capital sexual battery under Florida Statutes section 794.011(2). However, the trial court's failure to specifically instruct the jury on this element was harmless error where the defendant's age was not disputed and was obvious from evidence presented.
[1] The age of the defendant is an element of the offense of capital sexual battery under section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes.
[2] A jury instruction error regarding an element of a crime is harmless when the element is not a disputed issue and the evidence overwhelmingly supports the element.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the age of the victim (under twelve) is an element of the offense (and this is recognized by the Standard Jury Instruction on sexual battery of a victim under twelve which was given by the court in the instant case), then the age of the defendant, set out in the same section of the statute creating the offense, should also be.”
Establishes the court's reasoning that defendant's age should be an element where victim's age is an element and both are in the same statutory section
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn April 2000, Bruce Glover, age 35, was charged with capital sexual battery of a victim under twelve years old. Glover was convicted and sentenced to…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Glover v. State, 815 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with Jesus v. State, 565 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we approve the decision in the instant case and disapprove the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Jesus.
FACTS
In April 2000, Bruce Glover was charged with capital sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). In the information, the State alleged that the victim was under twelve years of age and that Glover was over eighteen years of age. Glover was thirty-five years old at the time he committed the offense. During the trial, the parties did not dispute that Glover was over eighteen. Glover was ultimately convicted of capital sexual battery and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Glover appealed his conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was invalid because the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury that the age of the defendant was an element of the offense of capital sexual battery that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court agreed and held that age is in fact an element of capital sexual battery.
Indeed, it seems that if the age of the victim (under twelve) is an element of the offense (and this is recognized by the Standard Jury Instruction on sexual battery of a victim under twelve which was given by the court in the instant case), then the age of the defendant, set out in the same section of the statute creating the offense, should also be.
Glover, 815 So. 2d at 699. In so holding, the district court noted that its holding was consistent with the decisions in Baker v. State, 604 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and D’Ambrosio v. State, 736 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The court, however, recognized conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Jesus.
Although the Fifth District held that age is an element of the crime of sexual battery, the court concluded that any error in the trial court’s instruction was harmless in this case. The district court reasoned that even though the trial court did not label Glover’s age as an element, it clearly advised the jury that Glover had to be over eighteen to be convicted of the main charge. The court stated that under the facts of this case, “the jury could not reasonably have found [Glover] to have been less than eighteen. For several days, they viewed this thirty-seven year old defendant sitting in the court room. Further, [Glover’s] booking admission that he was born in 1964 was admitted into evidence, and there was no evidence to the contrary.” Glover, 815 So. 2d at 700. The court therefore upheld Glover’s conviction.
Glover sought review of the Fifth District’s decision in this Court, alleging conflict with Jesus v. State, 565 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), in which the Fourth District held that age is not an element of capital sexual battery. We granted jurisdiction on the basis of that conflict.
We resolve the conflict between the opinions of the Fifth District in this case and the Third District in Baker and the opinion of the Fourth District in Jesus by approving the Fifth District and Third District’s holding that the age of the defendant is an element of capital sexual battery under section 794.011(2).
We approve the Fifth District’s decision to affirm Glover’s conviction in this case on the basis of Reed v. State, 887 So. 2d 366 (Fla.2002). Glover’s claim was based upon fundamental error in the standard jury instruction. Glover’s age of over eighteen years was, however, not a disputed element.
We therefore approve the Fifth District’s decision in this case and the Third District’s decision in Baker to the extent those decisions are consistent with this opinion. We disapprove Jesus to the extent that decision is inconsistent with this opinion. We decline to address the remaining issues raised by Glover that are unrelated to the conflict issue.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
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Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007)…uarantee.” Id. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. This Court has long applied Chapman’s harmless error analysis, which we outlined in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986), to claims of failure to instruct on an undisputed element. See Glover v. State, 863 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (Fla.2003) (approving the district court’s holding that the age of the defendant is an element of capital sexual battery but that any error in failing to instruct on this undisputed element was harmless); see also State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d…
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Pena v. State, 901 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2005)…re, Pena voiced no objection that the instruction did not include age as an element of the crime. Under the specific facts of this case, even if Pena had objected and preserved this issue for review, the error would be harmless. See Glover v. State, 863 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla.2003) (holding that although the defendant’s age is a statutory element of capital sexual battery, failure to include the age element in the jury instructions was not fundamental error where the defendant’s age was not a disputed fact). Th…
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Insko v. State, 969 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 2007)…s that the age of the offender is not an element of the offense of lewd or lascivious conduct.” Insko II, 933 So. 2d at 682-83. The court certified the following question as one of great public importance: “In light of the ruling in Glover v. State, 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla.2003), is the age of the offender an element of the offense of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes?” Below, we first consider the certified question. We then address Insko’s claim of entitlement to a discharge.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Jesus v. State, 565 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Glover v. State, 815 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Dewitt Henry Baker v. State, 604 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Thompson v. State, 887 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)