FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION AND RSKCO, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS S. BROWN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida Power Corporation and RSKCO appealed a workers' compensation order awarding medical monitoring to an employee based solely on asbestos exposure. The court reversed, holding that exposure to asbestos alone, without resulting disablement, does not constitute a compensable injury under Florida workers' compensation law.
Exposure to asbestos alone does not constitute a compensable injury. Under Florida law, an injury by accident requires either an unexpected or unusual event happening suddenly, or disablement resulting from an occupational disease. Because Brown established neither—his exposure was not sudden and unexpected, and he suffered no disability—he was not entitled to benefits or medical monitoring.
[1] Workers' compensation benefits are only payable for an injury by accident, which is defined as an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly.
[2] An occupational disease is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only upon the employee's disablement.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An employer is required to pay compensation or furnish benefits only if an employee suffers an injury by accident.”
Establishes the foundational requirement for workers' compensation eligibility under Florida law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas Brown was exposed to asbestos in the workplace. The Judge of Compensation Claims awarded medical monitoring benefits based solely on this expos…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Occupational Disease cases and more on FLexlaw
HAWKES, J.
The Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeal the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) order which awarded medical monitoring to Claimant Thomas Brown, based solely upon Brown’s exposure to asbestos. The E/C argue that, because Brown’s exposure to asbestos has not resulted in a work place “injury” as that term is defined by Florida law, the JCC erred by awarding benefits. We agree and reverse.
An employer is required to pay compensation or furnish benefits only if an employee suffers an injury by accident. See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). Two situations meet the statutory criteria to establish an injury by accident. The first is found in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2000), where “accident” is defined, in pertinent part, as “an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly.” Id. The second situation is when an employee suffers disablement, resulting from an occupational disease. See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).
It is well settled that asbestosis is an occupational disease. See Hyatt v. Armstrong Cork Co., 121 So. 2d 793, 794-795 (Fla.1960); Fla. State Hosp. v. Potter, 391 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Combustion Eng’g, Inc. v. Cote, 505 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). However, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an occupational disease becomes compensable only upon the employee’s disablement. See Glasrock Home Health Care v. Leiva, 578 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Thus, in occupational disease cases, it is the disability, not the diagnosis of the disease, which determines compensability of a claim. See Hoppe v. City of Lakeland, 691 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see also Hyatt, 121 So. 2d at 794-795 (noting time of “injury” for occupational disease is date an employee actually became disabled).
Accordingly, under the plain language of the statutes, Brown is entitled to benefits only if he suffers injury from “an unexpected or unusual event” that “happens suddenly” or he suffers disablement resulting from an occupational disease. Brown has not established that he suffered from either. Brown’s exposure to asbestos, standing alone, does not meet the definition of an injury by accident, because his exposure was not “an unexpected or unusual event” that “happened suddenly.” Similarly, Brown’s exposure to asbestos, standing alone, does not meet the definition of an occupational disease, because his exposure must also result in disablement. At this time, there is no evidence Brown has suffered any disability from his exposure.
Because Brown has not suffered an injury by accident as that term is defined by Florida law, the JCC’s award of medical monitoring is reversed. Additionally, because Brown was not entitled to the benefits awarded, the JCC’s award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (2000), which was based solely on benefits secured, is reversed as well.
REVERSED.
VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
City OF Port Orange & PGCS v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…on or benefits under the Act. See id. at 1119,1121. Three, since disablement or death is required by the statute, neither compensation nor benefits are available until the [*730] employee suffers disablement or death. See Fla. Power Corp. v. Brown, 863 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (noting that, even though employee was diagnosed with asbestosis, a permanent disease caused by his employment, since he had not suffered “disablement,” his disease was not an occupational disease under the Act). At issue h…
-
Orange Cnty. Fire Rescue & Unisource Administrators, Inc. v. Jones, 959 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…Accordingly, detection of an occupational disease does not necessarily coincide with the date of disablement from the disease. Id. (citing § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) and (1997)) (other citations omitted). See also Fla. Power Corp. v. Brown, 863 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing an order awarding medical monitoring in a case where the claimant was exposed to asbestosis, but not diagnosed with the disease, because the claimant had not (yet) suffered any injury, explaining that “an occupati…
-
Huff v. Loral Am. Beryllium Co., 967 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…y or aggravation of a pre-existing condition. As to this prong, the JCC concluded that Huff “has not established that he has suffered either an accident or an injury.” The JCC analogized the present claim to the case of Florida Power Corp. v. Brown, 863 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), where this court determined that exposure alone to asbestos did not result in a workplace injury. ANALYSIS As we have noted, Huff proceeds in this case solely on the theory of prolonged exposure under Festa. Huff abandoned his…
Authorities Cited
- Hoppe v. City OF Lakeland & Alexsis, Inc., 691 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Glasrock Home Health Care & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leiva, 578 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Fla. State Hosp. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Emaline Potter, 391 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Hodges v. State, 121 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1960)
- Combustion Eng'g v. Cote, 505 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)