MICHAEL SAMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2003-12-31
No. 4D02-156
FARMER, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur.
863 So. 2d 404 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Sampson appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and cannabis with intent to distribute after police found drugs in a fanny pack on a borrowed bicycle. The court reversed the conviction for cocaine possession with intent to sell, finding insufficient evidence of intent to sell, but affirmed the cannabis conviction and directed entry of judgment for simple cocaine possession.


Holding

The court reversed the conviction for cocaine possession with intent to sell because the State failed to present evidence that the quantity of cocaine was inconsistent with personal use or that Sampson intended to sell it. The conviction was reduced to simple possession of cocaine. The cannabis conviction was affirmed.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance requires proof of intent to sell, which cannot be solely inferred from the quantity of the substanc…

[2] The standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo.

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Key Quotes

“the State concedes that it failed to present sufficient evidence to prove intent to sell or deliver cocaine”

Establishes that even the prosecution acknowledged insufficient evidence for the intent element regarding cocaine

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Facts & Procedural History

Officer Broughton stopped Sampson for riding a bicycle without a headlight at 1:10 a.m. During a search of the borrowed bicycle, police found a fanny …

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Opinion of the Court
GUNTHER, J.

GUNTHER, J.

Michael Sampson timely appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine and cannabis with intent to distribute. We reverse and remand the trial court’s denial of a portion of Sampson’s motion for judgment of acquittal, but affirm in all other respects.

Officer Broughton, a Lauderhill police officer, observed Sampson riding a bicycle without the headlight on at about 1:10 a.m. Officer Broughton stopped Sampson and asked him about the headlight. Sampson told him he was on the way home from a friend’s house and had not realized the light was out.

Officer Broughton took Sampson into custody and searched the bike Sampson was riding. Hanging from the back of the bike was a fanny pack. Inside the fanny pack was a cigarette box containing cocaine rocks weighing 7.4 grams, a case containing cocaine rocks weighing 5.5 grams, and twenty-nine clear plastic bags containing cannabis.

Sampson was charged with one count of unlawful possession “with intent to sell manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine” and one count of unlawful possession “with intent to sell, manufacture or deliver for consideration, a controlled substance, to wit: Cannabis.”

Sampson testified at trial that the bike he was riding on the night in question was borrowed from a friend. Sampson also testified that at no time did he look inside the fanny pack on the bike. Sampson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. Sampson was convicted on both counts and now argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

The standard of review for a court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal is de novo. Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 2003 WL 22349638 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2003) (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002)). Although Sampson moved for a judgment of acquittal on several grounds, we find that only one aspect of Sampson’s motion for judgment of acquittal was improperly denied. Here, the State concedes that it failed to present sufficient evidence to prove intent to sell or deliver cocaine.

The record reveals that while 12.9 grams of cocaine were found in the fanny pack, the State failed to present evidence that the amount of cocaine found was inconsistent with personal use or that there was any other indication that Sampson intended to sell the cocaine. Thus, the denial of Sampson’s judgment of acquittal on this ground was improper. See McCullough v. State, 541 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (stating that the quantity of cocaine found can prove intent to sell where this amount is inconsistent with personal use, but finding that reversal was warranted as no evidence was presented that the defendant intended to sell the cocaine or that the cocaine was inconsistent with personal use as the 6.15 grams of cocaine found was not sufficient in and of itself to prove intent to sell).

Although the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of Sampson’s intent to sell cocaine, sufficient evidence was presented regarding the lesser included offense of possession. Thus, pursuant to section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2002), Sampson’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter judgment for possession of cocaine.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.

FARMER, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Essex v. State, 917 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …irst, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Essex’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge under Faison v. State. “The standard of review for a court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal is de novo.” Sampson v. State, 863 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted). In addressing the question of sufficiency of the evidence when moving for a judgment of acquittal, Essex admits the facts adduced in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the state which is fairly an…
  • Maglio v. State, 918 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …nor did he provide any witnesses in his defense. Maglio first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. “The standard of review for a court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal is de novo.” Sampson v. State, 863 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted). In addressing the question of sufficiency of the evidence when moving for a judgment of acquittal, Maglio admits the facts adduced in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the state which is fairly a…
  • Tevorance Lesane v. State, 895 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …the detectives was qualified as an expert in street level narcotics, the state failed to elicit any testimony from the detective as to the way in which the cocaine was packaged in order to show intent to sell. See id. at 1049. In Sampson v. State, 863 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court reversed a denial of a judgment of acquittal for possession of cocaine and cannabis with intent to distribute. While 12.9 grams of cocaine was found in appellant’s fanny pack, no evidence was presented that the amount…

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