VICTOR LAMBERT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Victor Lambert appeals his cocaine convictions, arguing the trial court violated his right to self-representation by denying his midtrial request to discharge counsel and proceed pro se. The appellate court affirms, holding that Lambert's request was untimely and therefore properly denied.
The trial court properly denied Lambert's request because it was untimely. Whether analyzed under a per se rule or abuse of discretion standard, the request made during active trial proceedings with potential for disruption was properly denied.
[1] A midtrial request to proceed pro se may be denied as untimely if made after the jury is empaneled.
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a midtrial request to proceed pro se when the request has the potential to disrupt the proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant's request for self-representation is untimely per se if it is made after a jury is empaneled”
Establishes the per se rule from Eleventh Circuit precedent that the court found persuasive authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter the State rested its case and the trial court discussed Lambert's right to testify, Lambert expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney during a…
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FULMER, Judge.
Victor Lambert appeals his convictions for sale and possession of cocaine, which resulted in concurrent ten-year prison sentences. He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his midtrial request to discharge his attorneys and proceed pro se. We affirm because the request to proceed pro se was untimely.
After the State rested its case, the trial court discussed with Lambert his right to testify on his own behalf. The court then took a brief recess for Lambert to discuss the issue with his counsel. When the court reconvened, Lambert told the judge that he was not happy with his attorney. The judge advised Lambert that if he discharged his counsel he would have to represent himself, and Lambert answered that he would like to be pro se and try the case himself. The trial court ultimately denied Lambert’s request.
On appeal, Lambert argues that he was deprived of his right to self-representation. He asserts that the trial court was obligated to conduct a Faretta
hearing to determine whether he was waiving his right to counsel knowingly and voluntarily. Once that was established, Lambert should have been allowed to proceed pro se. The State contends that Lambert’s midtrial request was properly denied because it was untimely. The State relies on federal cases holding that the right to self-representation may be waived if not asserted before trial.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant’s request for self-representation is untimely per se if it is made after a jury is empaneled. United States v. Young, 287 F. 3d 1352 (11th Cir.2002). Although Eleventh Circuit case law is not binding precedent on this court, it is persuasive. State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976). Other courts have declined to adopt a per se rule. See, e.g., United States v. Kosmel, 272 F. 3d 501, 506 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that once trial begins, court retains discretion to deny right of self-representation after balancing interest of the defendant against the potential disruption of the proceedings); United States v. Wesley, 798 F. 2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that after trial begins, the right of self-representation is subject to the trial court’s discretion, which requires balancing test).
In this case, we need not decide whether the denial of a request for self-representation based on the right having been untimely asserted should be governed by a per se rule or an abuse of discretion standard because using either standard here produces the same result. Lambert’s request was made at a time in the trial when there was a clear potential for disruption of the proceedings. Thus, the denial of the request was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
DAVIS and CANADY, JJ., concur. . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
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Thomas v. State, 867 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…t the trial judge should balance the right of the defendant to represent himself against the potential disruption of the trial proceedings (the abuse of discretion rule).3 We need not address that issue at present, however. As in -Lambert v. State, 864 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, No SC03-1786 (Fla.2003), Mr. Thomas’ request was “made at a time in the trial when there was a clear potential for disruption of the proceedings.” Moreover, Mr. Thomas demonstrated both vocally and physically that trial…
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Armas v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)…eny the request as there was clear potential for disruption of the proceedings. See Davis v. State, 162 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of defendant’s untimely request to represent himself); Lambert v. State, 864 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (affirming denial of mid-trial request to proceed pro se because there was a clear potential for disruption of the proceedings). This issue is without merit. The appellant has not raised any meritorious issue on appeal. The judg…
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Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976)
- United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1986)
- United States v. Laphonse Young, 287 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2002)