SAMUEL SAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2003-12-24
No. 4D03-3979
FARMER, C.J., GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
864 So. 2d 75 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Samuel Sapp challenged his consecutive sentences as illegal, arguing the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over one-third of each individual sentence rather than one-third of the total consecutive sentences. The appellate court reversed the summary denial of his motion and remanded for reconsideration, finding his claim facially sufficient and supported by statutory law.


Holding

The court held that the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over one-third of each consecutive sentence, rather than one-third of the total of consecutive sentences, violates the express language of section 947.16, Florida Statutes, and constitutes an illegal sentence properly subject to correction under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).


Headnotes

[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is the proper procedural vehicle to challenge a trial court's retention of…

[2] A sentence is illegal if it imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circum…

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Key Quotes

“a sentence is 'illegal' if it 'imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances'”

Establishes the legal standard for what constitutes an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a)

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Facts & Procedural History

On December 14, 1979, Sapp was sentenced to 99 years for kidnapping and 30 years for sexual battery, with both sentences to run consecutively. The tri…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), challenging the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over one-third of each of his two consecutive sentences. This is a proper claim for relief under rule 3.800(a). See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Fla.2001) (“a sentence is ‘illegal’ if it ‘imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances’ ”) (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). See also Kirtsey v. State, 855 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Hernandez v. State, 825 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

We find that appellant has stated a facially sufficient claim that his sentences are illegal, and that this is not refuted by the record.

On December 14, 1979, appellant was sentenced to 99 years in prison with credit for time served for one count of kidnaping, and to 30 years in prison for a count of sexual battery, again with credit for time served. The sentences were to run consecutively, with the court stating on each count that it would retain jurisdiction over that sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes. The trial court did not provide that it would retain jurisdiction over one-third of the total years imposed in the sentences on the two counts. Instead, it simply imposed the retention on each count.

We find that this violates the express language of section 947.16, Florida Statutes, and case law interpreting it. See Heath v. State, 558 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (reversing denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion, holding that the sentencing court should have retained jurisdiction over one-third of the total of the defendant’s consecutive sentences, rather than retaining jurisdiction over one-third of each of the consecutive sentences imposed). See also Famiglietti v. State, 499 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Brown v. State, 458 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

To the extent that the trial court concluded that appellant was barred from raising his sentencing challenge because he had made other challenges to the retention of jurisdiction on appeal and in other post-conviction motions, we find that the court erred because this precise issue was not raised before.

Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion, and remand to the trial court for further consideration of appellant’s claim on its merits. Unless there is record information refuting appellant’s claim, the trial court shall grant relief and correct or clarify appellant’s sentences in accordance with this opinion and the authorities cited herein.

FARMER, C.J., GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Little Willie Harper v. State, 874 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …failed to enter a written order to justify such retention. Hernandez v. State, 825 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We have held that this is a proper claim for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Hernandez, Sapp v. State, 864 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); See also Bingham, v. State, 813 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Hampton v. State, 764 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Macias v. State, 614 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Accordingly, we certify conflict with the opinions from…
  • Ayala-Laies v. State, 16 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
    …rather than one-third of the defendant’s sentence, where the statute in effect at the time of conviction and sentence should have been applied, rather than the statute in effect at the time of the offense). This court cited Heath in Sapp v. State, 864 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), in which this court reversed the denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion challenging the trial court’s retaining jurisdiction over one-third of each of his two consecutive sentences, instead of one-third of the total years imposed by t…

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