GREGORY A. BARBER, BRANDON L. RODAMMER AND MATTHEW G. WOODS, APPELLANTS,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By (11 total)

• Hale v. State, 891 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2004)
  …offense could be running concurrently, could have been completed, or could be consecutive to the [*522] Florida sentence. Under none of those scenarios would the current incarceration be as a result of the sexually violent offense. Tabor v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Therefore, reading sections 916.45 and 916.32(8)(g) together, we conclude that the Act applies to all persons who are currently incarcerated and who at some point in the past have been convicted of a sexually violent offe…
• Ward v. State, 986 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2008)
  …diction convictions in the statutory definition of a sexually violent offense if it intended the Act to apply only to those persons whose current incarceration involved a sexually violent offense. Hale, 891 So. 2d at 521-22; see also Tabor v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that Ryce Act does not require that current incarceration be for a sexually violent offense and cited with approval in Hale). Accordingly, we concluded that the Act applied to all persons who were currently incarce…
• Ward v. State, 936 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
  …er the “first clause” of section 394.925 because he was not in custody at the time the proceeding was commenced, “[t]he [Ryce] Act could be applicable to [him] in the future should he ever be sentenced to total confinement”); Tabor v. [*1148] State, 864 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(stating in a “clause one” case that “Appellant’s argument that his current incarceration must be as a result of a sexually violent offense is refuted by ... other provisions of the Ryce Act....”). Other provisions of the R…

Authorities Cited

• Urruchurtu v. State, 858 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)