MAMODOU NDOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2004-01-30
No. 5D03-421
PLEUS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.
864 So. 2d 1248 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 38 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Mamodou Ndow appeals his conviction for trafficking in cannabis, arguing that the traffic stop violating his rights was illegal because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirms the conviction, holding that the officer's observations of unusual driving behavior justified an investigatory stop for suspected impaired driving.


Holding

The officer's stop was justified. Although there was no observed traffic violation, a police officer may stop a vehicle operating in an unusual manner when there is reasonable suspicion of impaired driving based on the totality of circumstances, and here the unusual driving patterns—remaining motionless through a green light, slow driving, deliberate positioning behind the police vehicle, and occupants trading places—collectively supported reasonable suspicion of possible impaired driving.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer may initiate an investigatory stop of a vehicle operating in an unusual manner, even in the absence of a traffic violation or citation, to determine if t…

[2] A legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can justify a brief investigatory stop to ascertain if a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence.

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Key Quotes

“If a police officer observes a motor vehicle operating in an unusual manner, there may be justification for a stop even when there is no violation of vehicular regulations and no citation is issued.”

Establishes the core legal principle that unusual driving patterns alone can justify a stop without need for observed traffic violations

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Facts & Procedural History

On December 11, 2001, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Oakland Police Officer Chris Rapp observed a vehicle with Ndow and a companion parked on a Florida T…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIFFIN, J.

GRIFFIN, J.

Mamodou Ndow appeals his judgment and sentence for trafficking in cannabis. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress because the stop was illegal.

This case involves a traffic stop by an Oakland police officer of a vehicle containing appellant and another man which resulted in their arrest. The State charged appellant with one count of trafficking in 300 plants or twenty-five pounds of cannabis in violation of section 893.135(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (2001). Appellant filed “consolidated motions to suppress.” He maintained, inter alia, that: (1) the arresting officer had no reasonable or articulable suspicion of any criminal activity; (2) the arresting officer initiated the stop outside the jurisdiction of the Oakland Police Department; and (3) there was no ongoing investigation or basis for detention of appellant, i.e., no criminal offense or traffic infraction had been observed.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Officer Chris Rapp [“Rapp”] of the Oakland Police Department testified that on December 11, 2001, at approximately 2:00 a.m. he observed appellant and a companion in a stopped vehicle on the off ramp of the Florida Turnpike. Rapp noted that, although the car had a green light, it did not move but sat through the light’s entire cycle. The officer tried to observe whether the car or driver might be impaired. Rapp proceeded eastbound and then turned around. On the second green light, Rapp observed the car turn left and proceed eastbound on Colonial Drive. The car proceeded slowly in the left lane and then pulled into the right lane behind Rapp. The occupants then slowed down in an apparent effort not to pass the police vehicle, so Rapp turned into a motel in an attempt to let the vehicle pass. As he exited the motel, Rapp observed that the vehicle had pulled over to the side of the road and the occupants were trading places. At this point, because of multiple indications that appellant and his companion might be impaired, Rapp initiated a traffic stop. As Rapp and Sergeant Lowery approached the vehicle, Rapp smelled the odor of unburnt cannabis through the open driver’s side window. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

On appeal, appellant asserts that the stop was illegal because Rapp did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and there was no evidence of traffic violations. He maintains that the evi dence indicates that Rapp did not observe any objective driving patterns, such as continuous weaving, tires striking a raised curb, etc., that would lead to a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. Moreover, appellant maintains that there was no evidence that he committed a traffic violation.

We agree that the motion to suppress was properly denied. If a police officer observes a motor vehicle operating in an unusual manner, there may be justification for a stop even when there is no violation of vehicular regulations and no citation is issued. Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla.1975); State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). “The courts of this state have recognized that a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” DeShong, 603 So. 2d at 1352; Finizio v. State, 800 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In determining whether such an investigatory stop was justified, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances. Tamer v. State, 484 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla.1986). Considering the totality of the circumstances detailed above, Rapp’s suspicion that Ndow may be driving while impaired was reasonable and warranted the investigatory stop. See Finizio, 800 So. 2d 347; DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349; Bailey, 319 So. 2d 22.

AFFIRMED.

PLEUS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (29 total)

  • State v. Rodriguez, 904 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …s, retreating from the “reasonable officer test” established in State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1995). A stop may be justified even in the absence of a traffic infraction when the vehicle is being operated in an unusual manner. Ndow v. State, 864 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). A legitimate concern for the safety of the public can warrant such a stop. Id.; see also Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26-27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding vehicle’s abnormal movement in crossing fog line three times within…
  • State v. Jones, 935 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    …732 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (weaving several times within a single lane held sufficient to justify a stop where there was no evidence to show endangerment to others and where no traffic violation had occurred); see also Ndow v. State, 864 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“If a police officer observes a motor vehicle operating in an unusual manner, there may be justification for a stop even when there is no violation of vehicular regulations and no citation is issued.”).2 And there is no re…
  • Timeka Tubbs v. State, 897 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
    …e. We conclude the stop was reasonable. Accord, Brown v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 694, 440 S.E. 2d 619 (1994); State v. Trammel, 270 Ga.App. 395, 606 S.E. 2d 613 (2004); Home v. State, 237 Ga.App. 844, 517 S.E. 2d 74 (1999); see also Ndow v. State, 864 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). But cf. State v. Nichols, No. 97CA00156, 1998 WL 400902 (Ohio Ct.App. May 18, 1998) (defendant’s suspicious glance as he drove car by officer coupled with his switching seats with the passenger insufficient to create reasonable…

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