N.W., THE MOTHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2004-01-28
No. 4D03-1351
WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
865 So. 2d 625 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

A Florida appellate court affirmed a trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights to two children based on statutory grounds that the parent's continuing involvement would threaten the children's well-being and that the parent engaged in egregious conduct. The court rejected the mother's challenge to the termination order, finding it supported by competent substantial evidence.


Holding

The trial court's order terminating parental rights is affirmed as supported by competent substantial evidence. Although the trial court may have erred in failing to make specific findings regarding denial of the child testimony motion, this issue was deemed abandoned because it was not raised in the initial brief. The trial court properly took judicial notice of prior court orders including the dependency order and prior review hearings.


Headnotes

[1] Termination of parental rights requires the state to establish that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.

[2] An issue not raised in an initial brief is considered abandoned on appeal.

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Key Quotes

“because parental [rights] constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the state must establish in each case that termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.”

Establishes the high constitutional standard required for termination of parental rights

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Facts & Procedural History

N.W. is the mother of two children, A.S. and C.S. The trial court conducted a final hearing on termination of parental rights and entered an order ter…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

N.W., the mother, appeals the final order of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to two children, A.S. and C.S., pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), (f), Florida Statutes (2002).1 We find that the trial court’s order of termination is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991)(“[B]ecause parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the state must establish in each case that termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.”).

While it appears that the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings as to why it denied the mother’s motion to allow A.S. to testify at the final hearing, see Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.255(d)(2)(C)(stating that the court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling whether to allow a child witness to testify), this issue was not raised in the initial brief and is therefore abandoned. See J.A.B. Enters. v. Gibbons, 596 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Additionally, we find that it was proper for the trial court to take judicial notice of the prior court orders, including the dependency order, the orders from the periodic review hearings, and the order terminating the parental rights of the father. See § 90.202, Fla. Stat. (2002).

A court record is not subject to dispute: either it is or it is not a record of a court. When it is shown to the satisfaction of the trial judge that a document is a record of a court, then the judge should judicially notice it.

CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 202.6, at 59-60 (2008 ed.).

We have reviewed the other issues raised on appeal and find no error. Accordingly, the order of termination of parental rights is AFFIRMED.

WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . Section 39.806(l)(c) allows for termination of parental rights where the parent has engaged in conduct that demonstrates that the parent’s continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship would threaten the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services; section 39.806(l)(f) allows for termination where the parent has engaged in egregious conduct or acts as defined in the statute.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …easonable efforts to reunify the parent and child .... (emphasis added) . It is "proper for the trial court to take judicial notice of the prior court orders [because a] court record is not subject to dispute." N.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 865 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2010). . The record shows that C.G. did not substantially comply because she failed to participate in or failed to benefit from the services provided by DCF and this failure to comply endangered he…
  • City OF Miami v. Haigley, 143 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
    …oned any issues concerning these orders. See City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla.1959) ("An assigned error will be deemed to have been abandoned when it is completely omitted from the briefs.”); N.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 865 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that issues not raised in the initial brief are deemed abandoned). . See § 401.23(7), Fla. Stat. (2013) (defining "basic life support”); § 401.23(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (defining "advanced life support”). . The fee…
  • …Statutes (2019). Moreover, the Mother’s appellate brief does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the manifest best interests of the children; as such, this issue has been waived. See N.W. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 865 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We can therefore discern no basis for finding section (1)(l) impermissibly shifts the burden or constitutes a denial of due process, nor can the Mother demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists in which the statute…

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