SAMANTHA STEVINS, PETITIONER,
v.
COLLIER COUNTY, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 2004-02-18
No. 2D03-2077
DAVIS, SILBERMAN, and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur.
865 So. 2d 660 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2004)

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Synopsis

Samantha Stevins, a part-time public defender employee, sought review of a trial court order vacating her appointment as private counsel for an indigent defendant. The appellate court affirmed the vacation, holding that Stevins's appointment was unauthorized because she was already employed by the public defender's office and that office had not sought to withdraw from the case.


Holding

The trial court did not err in vacating its prior order appointing Stevins as private counsel because the appointment was not authorized under Florida law. A public defender employee cannot be appointed as private counsel in the same case without the public defender's office first withdrawing from representation.


Headnotes

[1] An order that conclusively determines the parties' rights and requires no further judicial action is a final order for purposes of appellate review.

[2] A petition for writ of certiorari may be treated as a final appeal when the order under review is final.

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Key Quotes

“The record reveals that Stevins was not appointed as private counsel at the inception of the case, nor did the public defender's office seek to withdraw from the case before Stevins filed her motion for appointment. Therefore, the order appointing Stevins as private counsel in the case was not authorized.”

Establishes the key factual and legal basis for finding the appointment unauthorized

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Facts & Procedural History

Stevins was a part-time employee of the Public Defender of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. She was assigned to represent a defendant in a racketeering…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Samantha Stevins has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial court’s order vacating a prior order appointing Stevins as private counsel for an indigent defendant. The order under review is a final order because it conclusively determines the parties’ rights and requires no further judicial action.

Therefore, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), we treat the petition for writ of certiorari as a final appeal subject to review under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A). See State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.2000) (discussing the test employed by an appellate court to determine the finality of an order).

We affirm the order. Stevins was a part-time employee of the Public Defender of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. As part of her duties for the public defender, she was assigned to represent one of the defendants in a racketeering case that went to trial in Collier County. During the period of time Stevins was employed by the public defender, she asked the trial court to appoint her to represent the indigent defendant as private counsel, and the court entered such an order.

The record reveals that Stevins was not appointed as private counsel at the inception of the case, nor did the public defender’s office seek to withdraw from the case before Stevins filed her motion for appointment.

Therefore, the order appointing Stevins as private counsel in the case was not authorized. See Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla.1980); see also §§ 27.53(2)-(3), .54(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because there was no legal basis for the court’s appointment of Stevins to the case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in correcting its prior action.

Accordingly, we affirm the order vacating the prior order appointing Stevins as counsel.

Affirmed.

DAVIS, SILBERMAN, and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur.


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