RICHARD E. FRIEND, APPELLANT,
v.
MARSHA LYNNE FRIEND, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Richard Friend appeals from an order unsealing his divorce case, which had been sealed by agreement with his former wife. The appellate court affirmed the unsealing, holding that dissolution of marriage proceedings cannot be closed based solely on the parties' agreement and that the public has a fundamental right of access to court records.
The court held that a dissolution of marriage proceeding cannot be closed based solely on the parties' wishes or agreement. Although courts have inherent power to seal records under limited circumstances, the agreement of the parties alone does not constitute a valid basis for sealing such proceedings. The presumption that a sealed record was correctly sealed can be overcome by demonstrating that the original sealing order was legally in error.
[1] A court file sealed solely based on the agreement of the parties may be unsealed.
[2] Parties seeking a dissolution of marriage are not entitled to a private proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“parties seeking a dissolution of marriage are not entitled to a private proceeding”
Establishes the fundamental principle that dissolution cases cannot be closed merely at the parties' request, distinguishing between parties' privacy interests and the public right of access to court proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1997, Friend and his former wife Marsha agreed to seal their dissolution of marriage case, and the trial court granted this request. Five years lat…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
Richard E. Friend appeals from an order unsealing his dissolution of marriage case at the request of Orion Group. We affirm.
On November 12, 1997, pursuant to an agreement between Friend and his former wife, Marsha Lynne Friend, the trial court ordered the file of their dissolution of marriage action sealed. Approximately five years later, Friend was sued in connection with legal services he provided to a group of companies involved in the development of resort properties. Orion Group, one of said companies, requested permission to intervene in and unseal the dissolution of marriage action on April 2, 2003 alleging possible discrepancies in representations made by Friend in the two cases.
Friend opposes the unsealing of the dissolution file on several grounds. After careful consideration and review of appellant’s position, we find none of the arguments sufficient to overcome the well established right of public access to court proceedings and records. See, e.g., Art. I, § 24, Fla. Const.; § 119.07, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.035; Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla.1988).
In Barron, the court recognized the trial court’s inherent power to control the conduct of its own procedures by closing all or parts of the proceedings but only in limited circumstances under specific guidelines. 531 So. 2d at 118. Once a record is sealed, there is a presumption that it was correctly sealed; however, a party moving to unseal the record may overcome the presumption by demonstrating that the original order sealing the record was legally in error. Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
In the instant case, it is evident that the trial court sealed the dissolution action based solely on the parties’ agreement. The denial of access to dissolution of marriage proceedings may not be based solely-upon the wishes of the parties to the litigation. As the Barron court stated “parties seeking a dissolution of marriage are not entitled to a private proceeding.” 531 So. 2d at 119.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s ruling below unsealing the court file.
Affirmed.
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Rocket Grp., LLC v. Jatib, 114 So. 3d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…be based solely upon the wishes of the parties to the litigation.’” BDO Seidman, LLP v. Banco Espirito Santo Intern., Ltd., — So. 3d -, 34 Fla. [*401] L. Weekly D739, 2009 WL 928484, *1 & *2 n. * (Fla. 3d DCA Apr.8, 2009) (quoting Friend v. Friend, 866 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)); Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 118-19 (Fla.1988). And even if a court allows confidential documents to be filed under seal, such an order merely establishes a way to file them pending the trial cou…
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BDO Seidman, LLP v. Banco Espirito Santo Int'l, Ltd. (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…is court is obligated to determine whether there is good cause to seal the documents even where, as here, the other parties do not object. Denial of access "may not be based solely upon the wishes of the parties to the litigation.” Friend v. Friend, 866 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).…
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Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Rush Limbaugh and Marta Miranda, 967 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…urts may enforce the right by any appropriate procedure. There is ample precedent for the proposition that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for public access to judicial records even if the case is closed. In Friend v. Friend, 866 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), this court allowed exactly the same procedure that The Post is requesting in the present case. In Friend, this court affirmed a trial court order which allowed a nonparty to intervene for the limited purpose of unsealing the…
Authorities Cited
- Dempsey J. Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988)
- Duke H. Scott, M.D. v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)